The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments by Law, DS
Title The Paradox of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, andCommitments
Author(s) Law, DS
Citation Georgia Law Review, 2005, v. 40 n. 2, p. 407-468
Issued Date 2005
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/228344
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
1THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE: 
COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMITMENTS*
David S. Law**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION:  THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF SOVEREIGN
OMNIPOTENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. THE MULTIFARIOUS CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY . . . . . . . . . 10
B. INALIENABLE ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
D. UNENFORCEABILITY OF JUDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
III. A TYPOLOGY OF COMMITMENTS AND 
COMMITMENT PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. EFFECTIVE VERSUS PERSUASIVE COMMITMENTS . . . . . . . . . 25
B. THE PROBLEMS OF UNDERPERSUASIVE AND 
OVEREFFECTIVE COMMITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
* At the request of the author, the Georgia Law Review has departed from certain of its
conventions.
   ** Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Assistant Adjunct Professor of
Political Science, University of California, San Diego.  B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Stanford University;
J.D., Harvard Law School; B.C.L. in European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford.
Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Symposium on Sovereignty held in April
of 2005 at the University of Texas School of Law, and at the 2005 Annual Conference of the
Midwest Political Science Association.  I am grateful for all comments received on both
occasions.  Later versions of this Article benefited greatly from probing and insightful
discussion at a USC Law School faculty workshop, the Colloquium on Law, Economics, and
Politics at NYU Law School, and the Center for the Study of Law and Society at Berkeley.  I
also wish to thank Larry Alexander, Gerhard Casper, Laurie Claus, John Ferejohn, Calvin
Johnson, Dan Klerman, Adam Kolber, Lewis Kornhauser, Sandy Levinson, Peter Lorentzen,
Andrei Marmor, Mat McCubbins, David McGowan, Mike Ramsey, Maimon Schwarzschild,
Martin Shapiro, Matt Spitzer, Barry Weingast, Jeff Wu, Jason Yackee, Ernie Young, and
David Zaring for their insights and suggestions.  Aarti Sujan provided diligent research
assistance.
2 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
IV. COURTS AS COMMITMENT MANAGERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. HOW COURTS CALIBRATE THE EXTENT OF
SOVEREIGN COMMITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. THE BASIC STRATEGIES FOR MAKING
PERSUASIVE COMMITMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
C. PERSUASIVE COMMITMENT AND THE
PLIGHT OF THE SOVEREIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
D. THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES:  JUDICIAL
REPUTATION AND THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER . . . . . . 50
E. ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT FORCE:  THE SUBTLE
ARTS OF THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION AS COMMITMENT . . . . . . . 58
2006] THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE 3
1 See, e.g., George I. Mavrodes, Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence, 72 PHIL. REV. 221
passim (1963) (discussing paradoxical aspects of omnipotence); C. Wade Savage, The Paradox
of the Stone, 76 PHIL. REV. 74 passim (1967) (same). 
2 PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT:  A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW,
OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 12 (1990); see also, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:  STUDIES
IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 147-49 (2000) (identifying and giving
political examples of the “paradox of omnipotence”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 149-52
(2d ed. 1994) (attempting to unravel the paradox by distinguishing between “self-embracing”
and “continuing” forms of legislative omnipotence).
3 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment:  The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803
(1989), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY:  POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN THE
MODERN WORLD 16, 17, 43-47 (Paul W. Drake & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 1998).
I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE PARADOX OF OMNIPOTENCE
Can God make a stone that He cannot lift?  That is, does infinite
power include the power to limit itself?  The question has long been
a subject of philosophical debate.1  It has also, on occasion, troubled
legal theorists and social scientists.  The paradox of omnipotence can
easily be recast in lawmaking terms:
In law the paradox is of parliamentary, legislative, or
sovereign omnipotence:  the power to make any law at
any time. . . . If an entity has the power to make any law
or do any act at any time, then can it limit its own power
to act or make law?  If it can, then it can’t, and if it can’t,
then it can.  If it can do any act at any time, then it can
limit or destroy itself, because that is an act; but it
cannot do so, because doing it means it cannot and could
not do any act at any time.  In the legal version we can
say that either there is a law that the sovereign cannot
make or a law that it cannot repeal.2
It has been the insight of social scientists that sovereign
omnipotence, of the type that cannot impair itself, can be a source of
considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves.  In an
influential article, Douglass North and Barry Weingast tell the story
of the English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.3  Each regime confronted a practical challenge
created by the paradox of its own omnipotence.  One flourished,
4 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
4 See id. at 16 (discussing the importance of sovereign commitment to property rights).
5 See id. at 17 (describing the English monarch’s resort to “forced loans”).
6 See id. at 16, 20-21 (observing that “responsible behavior” on the part of monarchs has
been a historical rarity, “in good part because the pressures and continual strain of fiscal
necessity eventually led rulers to ‘irresponsible behavior’ ”); see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 129-31 (1999) (noting the extent to which sovereigns
have tended to repudiate financial commitments); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions,
and the Problem of Government Commitment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245,
247 (Pierre Bourdieu & James Coleman eds., 1991) (same); Hilton L. Root, Tying the King’s
Hands:  Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime, 1 RATIONALITY
& SOC’Y 240, 240-41 (1989) (same).
7 North & Weingast, supra note 3, at 20-21; Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
Limited Government and Liberal Markets:  An Introduction to “Constitutions and
Commitment,” in THE ORIGINS OF LIBERTY, supra note 3, at 13, 14.
8 North & Weingast, supra note 7, at 14.
9 Id.
because it developed limits upon its own power; the other stagnated,
because it remained too powerful for its own good.
North and Weingast frame their account with a pair of closely
related observations.  First, it is often in a sovereign’s best interest
to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts.  For
example, a sovereign with absolute power can alter property rights
for his or her own benefit.  Yet people are less likely to engage in
productive economic activity or to invest in a particular country if
they fear that its ruler will confiscate the fruits of their labor.4
Similarly, creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at
favorable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts
at will.5  The second observation that North and Weingast make,
however, is that sovereigns have historically succumbed to the
temptation to break their commitments for short-term gain.6  Even
the prospect that citizens and lenders will refuse to cooperate again
in the future—that is, the threat of retaliation over repeat play—is
not always adequate to prevent reneging, particularly when the very
survival of a regime is at stake.7
In the competitive struggle to expand and sustain their respective
empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts
of capital.8  At the outset of the seventeenth century, however,
neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor
property rights.9  The absence of limitations upon the legal power of
kings meant that there was no law a king could make that he could
not also unmake or disregard.  Consequently, English and French
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10 See North & Weingast, supra note 3, at 22-25 (describing, inter alia, the English
Crown’s seizure of bullion that merchants had placed in the Tower of London for safekeeping);
Root, supra note 6, at 246-47 (describing, inter alia, the French Crown’s use of currency reform
to decrease the value of its debts); see also Shepsle, supra note 6, at 250 (discussing the capital
market repercussions of sovereign default).
11 See Root, supra note 6, at 253 (noting the adverse effect of sovereign default on public
borrowing costs); Shepsle, supra note 6, at 250 (same).
12 See North & Weingast, supra note 3, at 29-30 (characterizing the Glorious Revolution
as a “fiscal revolution”).
13 Id.
14 See id. at 32 (describing the reconfigured balance of power between King and
Parliament); DAVID STASAVAGE, PUBLIC DEBT AND THE BIRTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE:
FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1688-1789, at 79-82, 99-129, 176 (2003) (arguing that the rise of
parliamentary power, coupled with the development of the Whig Party, enhanced the political
influence of government creditors).
15 See North & Weingast, supra note 3, at 30, 32-33 (noting that new assurances of the
continuing “supremacy of common law courts” favored private rights).
16 See id. at 35-39.  A number of economic historians have, however, questioned the extent
to which the cost of public borrowing decreased as a result of the Glorious Revolution.  See
STASAVAGE, supra note 14, at 68-82 (reporting that interest rates on government debt were on
average lower to following the Glorious Revolution but nevertheless remained volatile for
several decades, and arguing that changes in partisan control of Parliament contributed
significantly to this volatility); Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial
kings alike earned a reputation for expropriating wealth,
repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments, by means
ranging from currency manipulation to outright force.10  Not
surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and
demanded higher interest rates from kings than from their wealthy
subjects.11
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement
imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought a
halt to such faithless conduct.12  Henceforth, only Parliament could
authorize taxes or provide for the financial needs of the Crown.13
Parliament, in turn, represented commercial interests that would
not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights.14
Meanwhile, English judges became assured of continued tenure
during good behavior, and their newfound independence enabled
them to vindicate property rights against King and Parliament
alike.15  According to North and Weingast, the Crown’s newfound
inability to dishonor its commitments to wealth holders translated
into a newfound ability to borrow:  public borrowing increased
vastly, even as interest rates fell dramatically, because lenders
concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.16  It was the
6 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth-Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2005)
(describing controversy regarding economic effect of Glorious Revolution); Nathan Sussman
& Yishay Yafeh, Constitutions and Commitment:  Evidence on the Relation Between
Institutions and the Cost of Capital, 3-5, 21-22 (Center for Economic Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 4404, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract$id=558641 (suggesting that, in the short term, the Glorious Revolution engendered
instability that actually increased interest rates).  Though Professors Klerman and Mahoney
decline to place causal weight upon the Glorious Revolution, they do concur in the broad
outline of the argument made by North and Weingast that institutional changes can decrease
the cost of public borrowing, insofar as their econometric analysis suggests that eighteenth-
century statutes granting greater independence to the judiciary decreased the cost of
government borrowing.  See Klerman & Mahoney, supra, at 8-25.  I am indebted to Dan
Klerman for bringing this historical evidence to my attention.
17 North & Weingast, supra note 3, at 35-39, 44.
18 See id. at 45-46 (describing Louis XIV’s inability to respond to fiscal crisis with
“fundamental institutional change”).
19 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 2, at 88-174 (considering reasons and devices for
“precommitment” in the context of constitutional law); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 87-96 (rev. ed. 1984) (same); STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT:  ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995) (explaining
constitutional “precommitment” as a solution to “the paradox of democracy”—namely, the
inability of democracy to function successfully without restraints); STASAVAGE, supra note 14,
at 1-25 (describing the relationship between government’s ability to make credible
commitments and the cost of public debt); Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the
Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 L. & PHIL. 327, 348-55 (1990) (justifying judicial review as a
form of “precommitment among free and equal sovereign citizens” to the ideals underlying
“democratic sovereignty”); Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 100-19 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989)
(arguing that constitutional constraints impose limits that “discipline . . . to more productive
use”); Shepsle, supra note 6, at 250-51 (observing that limitations on governmental discretion
can often be welfare-enhancing); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 633, 635-42 (1991) (characterizing constitutional precommittments as enabling devices
that facilitate self-government).
accidental genius of the Glorious Revolution, conclude the authors,
that the imposition of constitutional restrictions upon the ability of
the Crown to obtain capital by coercive means, at the expense of
creditors and citizens, enabled it to obtain even greater amounts of
capital at favorable terms.17  The French regime, by comparison,
underwent no comparable institutional transformation.  Unable to
raise war financing on the same scale as its English counterpart, it
met ultimately with bankruptcy—and the guillotine.18
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein,19
it is now fairly conventional to observe that constitutional
arrangements can and do benefit sovereigns by imposing limits upon
their power.  This school of thought is well-summarized by John
Ferejohn and Larry Sager:
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20 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1929, 1929 (2003); see also, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 257-60 (1999)
(describing and critiquing “the ‘precommitment’ view of constitutional constraints”).
Economists, social scientists, and legal theorists
sometimes argue that constitutional practices can
usefully be understood as commitment devices.  By
enshrining various aspects of procedure or substance in
a written document that announces itself as the supreme
source of law, and by making that document difficult to
change, a people can achieve a future better than any
they could otherwise attain.  The usual examples center
on using a constitution to commit to protecting private
property, to accord political and legal recognition to
unpopular minorities, and more generally to respect and
further the rule of law and democracy.
. . . On this view, a constitutionally-bound government
acquires capacity it would not otherwise have by
effectively restraining itself . . . .  A government which is
effectively bound to pay back its loans and honor its
contracts is thereby made better able to borrow money
and enter into contracts.  And a government that is
constitutionally barred from expropriating property is
thereby better able to attract capital.20
It is not always the case, however, that constitutions enhance the
ability of governments to make commitments.  What the literature
on constitutions and commitments has neglected is the extent to
which constitutions can have precisely the opposite effect.  Insofar
as they confer inalienable powers and immunities upon
governments, constitutions instead entrench barriers to commitment.
Consider again the example of the United Kingdom.  The
constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not
solve the paradox of omnipotence so much as it relocated the
problem from one organ of government to another:  whereas it was
once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now
Parliament that lacks this power.  The doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it
8 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
21 See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-
32, 39-70 (10th ed. 1959) (defining the English “constitution”, and identifying parliamentary
sovereignty as one of its components); JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
PARLIAMENT:  HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1999) (observing that “there are no fundamental
constitutional laws that Parliament cannot change, other than the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty itself”); George Winterton, The British Grundnorm:  Parliamentary Supremacy Re-
examined, 92 L.Q. REV. 591, 612 (1976) (noting that there is “simply no judicial support
whatever” for the view that Parliament can “impose limitations on the content or ambit of
future legislation”).
22 DICEY, supra note 21, at 39-40.  The influential English legal theorist H.L.A. Hart
acknowledged that parliamentary sovereignty posed a paradox of omnipotence and sought to
resolve the paradox by drawing a distinction between continuing and self-embracing
omnipotence:  self-embracing omnipotence includes the power to limit one’s own omnipotence,
whereas continuing omnipotence is, as its name suggests, omnipotence that cannot
permanently impair itself.  HART, supra note 2, at 149-52.  In practice, British courts have
interpreted parliamentary sovereignty as a form of continuing omnipotence, albeit one that
arguably permits Parliament to impose heightened procedural requirements upon itself.  See
Winterton, supra note 21, at 596-613 (acknowledging Parliament’s inability to “impose
limitations on the content or ambit of future legislation,” but also describing disagreement
among scholars over the extent of Parliament’s ability to alter the “manner” or “form” by which
it exercises legislative power).  Thus, for example, if Parliament specifies in legislation that
it can only withdraw from the European Union or repudiate E.U. law upon an unmistakably
clear statement of its intent to do so, the courts will honor and enforce that requirement
against Parliament.  If Parliament were to enact legislation that withdraws the United
Kingdom from the European Union, however, there is little question—at least for now—that
British courts would honor the withdrawal.  See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 21, at 15, 244-45
(observing that parliamentary sovereignty might fall victim to the passage of time “if it ever
comes to be generally accepted by British legal officials that Parliament has lost its authority
to withdraw Britain from the European Community”). 
provides, in effect, that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent
of its own legal power.21  In Dicey’s authoritative formulation,
“Parliament . . . has, under the English constitution, the right to
make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, . . . no person or
body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”22  Such
legislative omnipotence renders the United Kingdom theoretically
incapable, for example, of forever relinquishing its control over
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23 See, e.g., HART, supra note 2, at 120-22 (noting doubts as to whether “courts in the
United Kingdom would recognize the legal competence of . . . Parliament . . . irrevocably to cut
down its powers”); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, § 3.5(d), at 3-11 to 3-13
(4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005) (discussing section 2 of the Canada Act, 1982, and its questionable
legality as a matter of British constitutional law); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law,
89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 664-65 n.37 (2005) (observing that “parliamentary sovereignty . . .
prevents Parliament from ridding itself of legislative power over former British colonies”);
Winterton, supra note 21, passim (questioning the efficacy of legislative efforts to limit power
of future Parliaments).
24 See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 21, at 244 (observing that “if Parliament were
tomorrow to legislate to terminate Britain’s membership . . . British courts would almost
certainly acquiesce”); Law, supra note 23, at 664-65 n.37 (describing parliamentary sovereignty
and its consequences); O. Hood Phillips, Q.C., Self-Limitation by the United Kingdom
Parliament, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 467 (1975) (deeming it “[t]he strictly constitutional
position” that Parliament can “repeal or unilaterally amend” the domestic statute by which
the United Kingdom joined the European Union); see also, e.g., Peter Mirfield, Can the House
of Lords Lawfully Be Abolished?, 95 L.Q. REV. 36 passim (1979) (questioning Parliament’s legal
ability to abolish the House of Lords).
25 See infra notes 29-106 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 107-164 and accompanying text.
Canada or Australia23 or of making a binding membership
commitment to the European Union.24
This Article advances several claims about the nature of the
commitment problems that governments face, and the role of
constitutions and courts in addressing them.  Part II elaborates the
argument that constitutions do not necessarily solve commitment
problems but can instead aggravate them by entrenching inalienable
governmental powers and immunities.25  Part III argues that actors
make profoundly different types of commitments that engender more
than one variety of commitment problem.26  In particular, it is
necessary to distinguish between effective and persuasive
commitments, on the one hand, and the problems of underpersuasive
and overeffective commitment, on the other.  Other scholars have
dwelt mainly upon what might be termed the problem of
underpersuasive commitment—namely, the inability of sovereigns
to make persuasive commitments in the absence of adequate
limitations upon their own power.  The potential for overeffective
commitment, by comparison, has not been identified by scholars as
a problem for governments but ought to be of concern, for any
categorical solution to the problem of underpersuasiveness runs the
risk of hobbling the government permanently while exceeding what
is necessary to ensure the government’s ability to make persuasive
10 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
27 See infra notes 165-208 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 209-217 and accompanying text.
29 See generally, e.g., PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001)
(collecting various accounts of how real-world sovereignty fails to comply with any tidy
theoretical definition); Michael A. Gillespie, Sovereign Selves and Sovereign States:  Political
Theory for a New Millenium, in FREEDOM AND THE HUMAN PERSON (Richard L. Velkley ed.,
forthcoming 2006) (explaining and critiquing traditional notions of individual and state
sovereignty); Antonio Estella, Constitutional Legitimacy and Credible Commitments in the
European Union, 11 EUR. L.J. 22, 31-34 (2005) (identifying and contrasting “two models of
what constitutions are and should be,” the “instrumental model” and the “axiological model”);
Hardin, supra note 19, at 100-19 (taking issue with the conventional view that constitutions
are social contracts, and arguing instead that they are coordination devices).
30 See DICEY, supra note 21, at 23-32, 39-70 (defining England’s unwritten “constitution”).
commitments.  Part IV explores how courts can navigate a course
between these perils and manage the extent of the sovereign’s
commitments, even in the face of constitutionally entrenched
barriers to commitment.27  It will be argued, however, that in
performing these functions, courts risk damage to the basis of their
own power—namely, their reputation for rendering fair and
efficacious judgments.  The discussion will focus mainly upon
Supreme Court decisions, but also upon the occasional foreign
example.  Finally, this Article concludes with some observations as
to why lawsuits against the government can be in the government’s
own best interests, and how the doctrine of sovereign immunity, of
which the Court has recently been so enamored, may in fact do the
sovereign more harm than good.28
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF SOVEREIGN
OMNIPOTENCE
A. THE MULTIFARIOUS CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
What is a constitution, and what is a sovereign?  Each of these
threshold questions is itself the subject of an extensive literature.29
For present purposes, a constitution can be defined, along Diceyan
lines, as the set of rules and practices—written or otherwise—that
allocates, and structures the exercise of, public power.30  The
sovereign, in turn, can be understood simply as the repository of this
power.  By allocating and defining public power in different ways,
different constitutions create different kinds of sovereigns.  For
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31 See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 6, at 11, 20 (describing how states can allocate authority
among domestic, supranational, and extranational actors); ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 19-23, 45-107, 235-43 (2004) (discussing how collaboration between
the European Court of Justice and national courts has curtailed the policymaking autonomy
of the European Union’s member states); Law, supra note 23, at 664-65 n.37 (describing how
the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union and incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights have strengthened the role of British and European judges at
the expense of Parliament).
32 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS:  HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 19-37
(2002) (explaining why “policy stability,” or the difficulty of significant change in the status
quo, “increases in general with the number of veto players”); Gary W. Cox & Mathew D.
McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS,
PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 61-63 (Stephen Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001)
(discussing the relationship between policy stability and number of veto players).
example, a constitution can concentrate sovereign power in the
hands of a single individual, or it can disperse power among actors
and institutions—some of which may even fall outside the state’s
borders.31  A monarch who claims absolute power as a matter of
divine right is one type of sovereign; a government such as our own,
in which competing actors endowed with overlapping powers
continually frustrate one another in their efforts to make effective
policy, is another type of sovereign.
The ability of a sovereign to make commitments that are binding,
or merely credible, will depend upon how a given constitution
happens to configure sovereign power.  The mere existence of a
constitution tells us nothing about a sovereign’s capacity for either
action or restraint.  Rather, certain aspects of a constitution may
facilitate sovereign commitment, while other aspects may hinder it.
One relevant variable is the extent to which sovereign power is
concentrated or diffuse.  As North and Weingast observe, the
English monarchy was hamstrung in its efforts to make credible
commitments by the very fact that it shared power with no one:
prior to the Glorious Revolution, the relevant constitutional
arrangements featured no actor who could prevent the king from
changing his mind as to prior commitments.
By contrast, a diffusion of sovereign power—as in the form of
federalism, or a tripartite separation of powers—creates a multitude
of sovereign actors and equips them with the means to obstruct one
another.  The natural result of an abundance of veto players is policy
stability, or gridlock.32  A tendency toward gridlock not only makes
12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
33 Cf. STASAVAGE, supra note 14, at 79-82, 99-129, 176 (suggesting that the cost of public
borrowing in England varied with the parliamentary strength of the Whig Party, which
represented the interests of the creditor class).
34 HOLMES, supra note 19, at 114.
35 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
it difficult for the sovereign to do things, but also makes it difficult
for the sovereign to undo things.  Thus, a government prone to
gridlock should be slow to make commitments, but it should also be
slow to break them once they have been made.  In particular, the
greater the number of veto players, the more likely it becomes that
those who bear the cost of repudiation will have controlling influence
over a veto player and can thus prevent the government from
repudiating in the first place.33
Even a constitution that diffuses and restricts sovereign power
can, however, erect other barriers to sovereign commitment.  Our
own Constitution, in particular, confers upon the government a
variety of powers that cannot be alienated and immunities from
judicial process that cannot be irrevocably waived.  The result is to
render certain sovereign commitments legally unenforceable or,
indeed, void from the outset.  Three constitutional barriers to
sovereign commitment will be discussed here—the notion that
sovereigns enjoy inalienable powers, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, and the rule that money judgments cannot be enforced
against the United States.
B. INALIENABLE ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY
Constitutions routinely implement what Stephen Holmes calls
the “self-destruction taboo”:  that is, they render the sovereign
incapable of disabling itself, or of alienating its own power.34  To
render a sovereign incapable of disabling itself, however, is also to
ensure that the sovereign can escape its commitments.  If the
sovereign cannot limit its future freedom of action, it cannot commit
itself to any particular course of action either.
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States Trust Co. of New
York v. New Jersey35 illustrates the constitutionalization of the self-
destruction taboo.  United States Trust concerned a deliberate
legislative effort to impair the debt obligations of the Port Authority
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36 Id. at 2.
37 Id. at 7.
38 Id. at 9-10.
39 Id. at 10-11.
40 Id. at 13-14.
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 3.
42 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 3-4.
43 Id. at 32.
44 Id. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (protesting that “this is the first case in some 40
years in which this Court has seen fit to invalidate purely economic and social legislation on
the strength of the Contract Clause,” and accusing the majority of a return to Lochner-era
“economic due process” and “substantive constitutional review” of state policy).
45 Id. at 23 (majority opinion); id. at 46-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
of New York and New Jersey, a public body created by a bistate
compact between New York and New Jersey.36  The Port Authority
finances its operations in part by issuing bonds secured by a “general
reserve fund” into which all of its surplus revenues are pooled.37  In
order to promote investor confidence in the Port Authority and
thereby reduce its borrowing costs, New York and New Jersey jointly
enacted a “statutory covenant” that limited the uses to which the
Port Authority’s reserves could be applied without bondholder
consent.38  In particular, the 1962 covenant provided that the
reserves would not be used without bondholder consent to fund
commuter rail operations, except to the extent that specified reserve
amounts were met and operating deficits remained within specified
limits.39  By the mid-1970s, however, New York and New Jersey
were so desirous of expanding the Port Authority’s commuter rail
operations that they retroactively repealed the 1962 covenant.40
Port Authority bondholders brought suit in state court challenging
the repeal of the covenant as a violation of the Contract Clause,
which forbids any state from passing a “Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”41  The New Jersey courts rejected the
claim.42
The Supreme Court looked more favorably upon the argument
and struck down the repeal of the covenant.43  For the dissenters, the
majority’s use of the Contract Clause to invalidate state legislation
reeked unacceptably of the Lochner era.44  Both sides agreed,
however, that as a matter of federal constitutional law, there are
certain powers that states cannot alienate and, therefore, certain
contractual commitments that states cannot be forced to observe.45
14 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
46 Id. at 23 (majority opinion).
47 Id. at 21 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934)).
48 Id. at 24.
49 Id. at 25 n.23 (quoting Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)).
50 Id. at 24.
51 Id. at 25.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 26.  Professor Tribe’s discussion of United States Trust highlights this aspect of
the case:
Despite the Framers’ evident inattention to the danger that states might
be even more tempted to break their own promises than to help private
debtors break theirs, the Court seems correct in stressing the heightened
need for judicial oversight when ‘the State’s self-interest is at stake,’ and
hence in adopting ‘a dual standard of review,’ with stricter scrutiny of state
(or federal) abrogations of governmental obligations than of legislative
interference in the contracts of private parties.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-11, at 620 (2d ed. 1988).
54 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 874, 888-89 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(recounting the history of the doctrine, and assuming, without holding, that it applies to
federal as well as state contracts).
In the majority’s formulation, “the Contract Clause does not require
a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute
of its sovereignty.”46  The Court’s task, therefore, was “to reconcile
the strictures of the Contract Clause with the ‘essential attributes
of sovereign power’ necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard
the welfare of their citizens.”47  On the one hand, the Court deemed
it beyond question that states possess “the power to enter into
effective financial contracts”:48  states reserve no “sovereign right to
withhold payment” when they “borrow money and contract to repay
it.”49  On the other hand, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the majority
stressed that the police power and the power of eminent domain
could not be “contracted away.”50  Deliberate impairment of a
contractual obligation remains constitutional “if it is reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose”:51  a state cannot,
for example, be forced to honor a financial commitment that would
prevent it from acting for “health or safety reasons.”52  The Court
warned, however, that “complete deference” to a state’s judgment as
to the “reasonableness and necessity” of a contractual impairment
is not appropriate when “the State’s self-interest is at stake.”53
The notion that there are constitutional limits upon the ability of
a sovereign to contract away certain powers has come to be known
in American jurisprudence as the “reserved powers” doctrine,54 but
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55 See Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract:  Damages for Breach of Contract by
Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 471-79, 490-93 (1999) (comparing American,
British, and Canadian approaches to sovereign contractual liability, and observing that the
same “principle of legislative supremacy” that underlies the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is also “bedrock in American law”).
56 See id. at 471 (describing sovereign immunity as “[t]he starting point in Anglo-American
jurisdictions” for any discussion of the law of government contracts).
57 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:  Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-39 (1963) (identifying enforcement of government contracts as one of the
few contexts in which sovereign immunity has traditionally operated to bar suit).
58 See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“A sovereign is exempt
from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1890) (“The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.  This
has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary
to be formally asserted.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (deeming it “inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent”).
59 See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:  THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 58-80 (1987) (discussing the largely successful efforts of
Louisiana and other states to avoid federal judicial enforcement of their debts); Hadfield, supra
note 55, at 471-73, 479 (describing how Congress can, by withdrawing consent to suit or
the concept is hardly unique to this country.  The doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty also imposes analogous limits upon the
capacity of governments in other jurisdictions, such as Canada and
the United Kingdom, to bind themselves via contract.55  Of all the
attributes of sovereignty that cannot be surrendered, however,
perhaps none poses a greater obstacle to the enforcement of
sovereign commitments than the sovereign’s immunity from suit.
C. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The plaintiff bondholders in United States Trust were fortunate
to have been able to bring suit against New Jersey at all, much less
to have prevailed upon appeal to the Supreme Court.  As in other
Anglo-American jurisdictions,56 anyone in this country who seeks
judicial enforcement of a commitment made by the government must
contend with the formidable obstacle of sovereign immunity.57  In its
simplest form, sovereign immunity refers to the rule that a sovereign
is immune from suit in its own courts unless it gives consent.58
Sovereign immunity ensures the ability of the state and federal
governments to escape judicial enforcement of their contractual
obligations and debts59 for the same conceptual reason that
16 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
eliminating jurisdiction in pending suits, prevent courts from adjudicating federal contractual
obligations).  
60 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580-82 (1934) (observing that “immunity
from suit is an attribute of sovereignty which may not be bartered away,” and that Congress
may withdraw all judicial and administrative remedies for federal breach of contract “[s]o long
as the contractual obligation is recognized” and honored by other means); District of Columbia
v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 62-66 (1901) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a suit to enforce
contractual liabilities incurred by the District of Columbia’s Board of Public Works because
Congress had enacted a statute directing dismissal of such proceedings and forbidding
payment of judgments in such cases).
62 WILLIAM G. ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY:  THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 27 (1983).
63 Rhode Island, for example, forced its creditors to accept partial repayment of principal
in badly devalued paper money, while North Carolina chose simply to repudiate one-quarter
of the value of its outstanding debt certificates.  Id. at 30, 32. 
64 See id. at 24 (noting, for example, that “[r]unaway inflation, caused in large part by
excessive currency emissions and lax taxing practices, ruined the states’ credit and made
attempts to borrow money futile”).
65 See id. at 40-41; CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES:  THE
MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 223-46 (2005) (describing Hamilton’s successful
efforts to secure adoption of a constitution that would enable the federal government to
salvage its creditworthiness). 
66 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 40-41 (describing how various constitutional
Parliament cannot irrevocably commit the United Kingdom to
membership in the European Union60—namely, the paradoxical
inability of sovereign power to restrict itself.  A sovereign has the
power to subject itself to suit in its own courts today, but it also has
the power to revoke its consent tomorrow, and it cannot rid itself
today of the power to revoke its consent tomorrow. 61
The history of sovereign immunity doctrine in this country is, in
significant part, a story of how states have struggled from the
nation’s inception to avoid paying their debts.  The states had
incurred heavy debts in the course of the Revolutionary War; in
some cases, interest payments alone amounted to ninety percent of
all government expenditures.62  Efforts by state governments to
dilute or repudiate their debts were common,63 and such policies had
predictably ruinous effects upon the ability of the states to obtain
further capital.64  Creditors favored ratification of the Constitution
in the hope that it would institute a strong national government
willing and able to assume and discharge public debt on terms
favorable to them.65  The provisions of the Constitution were indeed
kind, on the whole, to creditors66—too much so, in the eyes of some.
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provisions facilitated discharge of public debt); JOHNSON, supra note 65, at 223-46 (same).
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
68 Id. (“No state shall . . . coin Money . . . make any thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender
in Payment of Debts . . . .”).
69 ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 30; JOHNSON, supra note 65, at 270-71.
70 BRUTUS (XIII) (Feb. 21, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 428, 430
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’
CONSTITUTION 57 (1988) (describing Anti-Federalist criticism of Article III).
71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted); see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1890) (quoting the views of
Hamilton, Madison, and John Marshall); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability:  An
“Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1305-06 (1998)
(describing Hamilton’s attack on Brutus’s assumption that federal courts would possess
jurisdiction to enforce state contracts).
72 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
73 Id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.); see also JOHNSON,
supra note 65, at 263-68 (setting forth Chisholm’s factual background); Doyle Mathis,
Chisholm v. Georgia:  Background and Settlement, 54 J. AM. HIST. 19, 20-23 (1967) (same).
74 See, e.g., ORTH, supra note 59, at 22-29 (canvassing the conflicting views held by
North Carolina, for example, initially declined to ratify the
Constitution partly for fear that the Contract Clause67 and the
prohibitions against issuance of paper money or enforcement of
tender laws68 would require states to honor their debts at face
value.69  
The Anti-Federalists argued, in particular, that the federal
judiciary contemplated by Article III of the proposed Constitution
would enable creditors to obtain federal enforcement of state debts.
The criticism, made by Brutus and echoed by other Anti-Federalists,
that Article III would enable individuals to obtain federal
“judgments and executions . . . against the state for the whole
amount of the state debt”70 prompted Hamilton to insist in Federalist
No. 81 that sovereign immunity would shield the states from federal
judicial enforcement:  “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty,”
he asserted, “not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent.”71  As it turned out, however, the fears expressed by
Brutus were well founded.  In Chisholm v. Georgia,72 the Supreme
Court concluded that it had jurisdiction under Article III over a suit
brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the unconsenting
state of Georgia to collect money owed for goods sold to
Revolutionary forces.73  Scholars have disagreed over whether it was
understood at the time the Constitution was ratified that the states
would enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.74
18 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
Madison, Hamilton, Marshall, and others, and likening “[t]he search for the original
understanding on state sovereign immunity . . . to the quest for the Holy Grail”); John V. Orth,
The Eleventh Amendment and the North Carolina State Debt, 59 N.C. L. REV. 747, 750 (1981)
(observing that “no consensus has emerged on the original understanding of sovereign
immunity under the Constitution of 1787”); Pfander, supra note 71, at 1272-73 (noting that
“many understood Article III to have subjected states to suit in federal court to some degree,”
and describing revisionist scholarly accounts of the Eleventh Amendment that challenge the
Court’s view of history).
75 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see LEVY, supra note 70, at 59 (describing how states reacted
to Chisholm); ORTH, supra note 59, at 7 (same).
77 ORTH, supra note 59, at 7; Orth, supra note 74, at 753-54.
78 Orth, supra note 74, at 758-59.
79 See, e.g., ORTH, supra note 59, at 94-96 (describing tactics employed by Virginia’s
“Readjusters”).
80 See Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240, 241 (1896) (describing the 1879
amendment to North Carolina’s constitution prohibiting repayment of certain bonds absent
voter approval); ORTH, supra note 59, at 66 (describing the debt ordinance provision of
Louisiana’s new constitution).
Nevertheless, Chisholm created such a “shock of surprise,” in the
Court’s own words,75 that the states quickly secured passage of the
Eleventh Amendment, which stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction over suits “against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”76
The Reconstruction era inaugured a second round of debt
repudiations by state governments that would once again culminate
in the expansion of sovereign immunity.  In southern states left
destitute by the Civil War and the end of slavery, “carpetbagger”
state governments compounded antebellum debts with extravagant
borrowing and spending.77  The end of Reconstruction and the
restoration of home rule to the former Confederate states proved
disastrous to former slaves and state creditors alike.78  The question
was not whether the southern states would attempt to repudiate
their debts, but rather how they would seek to do so.79  As if to mock
the notion that constitutions enable sovereigns to make credible
commitments, Louisiana and North Carolina amended their
constitutions to prohibit the full repayment of their bonds.80
Litigation over the Louisiana amendment and similar legislative
maneuvers would prove to have far-reaching consequences for the
law of sovereign immunity.  
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment purported only to eliminate
federal jurisdiction over lawsuits brought against a state by citizens
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81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
82 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
83 Id. at 21.
84 Id. at 5-6 (argument for plaintiff in error).
85 ORTH, supra note 59, at 68-71.
86 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
87 Id. at 89.  But see South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310-20 (1904) (holding,
5-4, that South Dakota could sue on its own behalf for payment on bonds that it had received
by way of outright gift); ORTH, supra note 59, at 83-85 (describing how creditors sought to
encourage repayment by threatening to donate state bonds to sovereigns capable of bringing
suit in federal court).
88 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330-32 (1934); ORTH, supra note 59,
at 85-86, 140-41.
89 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
of another state or by subjects of a foreign state; its language did not
speak to suits by a citizen against his own state, to suits brought by
a state itself, or to suits brought by a foreign nation.81  In Hans v.
Louisiana,82 however, the Court held that the states enjoy sovereign
immunity in federal court from suits brought by their own citizens:
it construed the Eleventh Amendment, in effect, as merely the
visible reminder of a broader constitutional “rule which exempts a
sovereign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of
individuals.”83  Bondholders sought federal judicial enforcement by
other means but were frustrated repeatedly by the judicial
expansion of sovereign immunity doctrine.84  Some sought to avoid
the Eleventh Amendment, and to bring themselves within Article
III’s explicit grant of federal jurisdiction over suits between states,
by assigning their bonds to states—namely, New York and New
Hampshire—that had volunteered to sue the debtor states for
payment and remit any net recovery to the original bondholders.85
The ploy failed:  the Supreme Court reasoned, in New Hampshire v.
Louisiana,86 that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits in which a
state acted as a “mere collecting agent” for private citizens.87  Nor
did the Constitution permit a foreign sovereign to bring suit against
an unconsenting state in federal court, as Monaco discovered when
it attempted to collect on bonds issued by Mississippi.88 
In sixteenth-century England and France, the ease with which
the sovereign could renege upon its commitments raised the cost and
increased the difficulty of public borrowing, to the sovereign’s own
detriment.89  By the same token, the protection of sovereign
20 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
90 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.); see also
United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 42-43 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denouncing
the Court’s “love affair” with the “thoroughly discredited” doctrine of sovereign immunity).
91 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks power
under Article I to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state court);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks power under the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at
33-34 (majority opinion) (insisting that any federal waiver of sovereign immunity be
“unequivocally expressed” and narrowly construed).
92 See Law, supra note 23, at 679 (discussing the concept of “legitimacy”).
93 See, e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1882) (questioning whether federal
courts can ever “assume all the executive authority of the State,” including its taxing and
immunity may do states more harm than good.  History surely
teaches creditors that sovereign immunity enables states to
repudiate their debts without fear of judicial intervention, and
rational creditors must be expected to demand greater returns in
exchange for taking such risks.  Nevertheless, the idea that
sovereigns must enjoy immunity from suit absent their consent—an
idea long ago criticized by Chief Justice Jay as “feudal”90—is one that
the Supreme Court has only nurtured in recent years.91 
D. UNENFORCEABILITY OF JUDGMENTS
Even if a sovereign explicitly waives its constitutional immunity
from suit and allows a suit to proceed to judgment without revoking
its consent, there remains the issue of whether a court can then
enforce that judgment against the sovereign.  Such enforcement
raises both practical and legal problems.  As a practical matter, it is
not surprising that a court might balk at rendering money
judgments against a distinct sovereign or, worse still, a coordinate
branch of government.  When courts dare to direct their judgments
at the institutions of government that control the powers of purse
and sword, they may be lucky merely to escape retaliation, much
less to secure compliance.  This inability of courts either to resort to
force or to allocate scarce resources leads courts to fret over their
“legitimacy,” which refers in practice simply to their ability to obtain
voluntary compliance with their decisions.92
Not surprisingly, the practical difficulty of enforcing judgments
against an unconsenting sovereign has loomed large in the Court’s
sovereign immunity decisions.93  In Chisholm, for example, Chief
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spending powers, in order to ensure that state bonds are repaid in full); ORTH, supra note 59,
at 66-67, 77 (contrasting the Court’s refusal to enforce state bonds held by private bondholders
with its willingness to enforce state bonds held by the United States, and attributing this
difference to “fears of rendering unenforceable judgments” that “haunted the Court” in the
former case but not in the latter).
94 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477.
95 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-57 (1962) (plurality opinion) (recounting
the history of the Court of Claims).
96 Id. at 570 (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850)).
97 See, e.g., id. at 568-71 (discussing the exclusivity of congressional responsibility for
appropriations and spending); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 580 (1933) (“[A] power
definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be surrendered nor
delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency.”);
United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 303 (1854) (expressly
rejecting the proposition that federal courts can “command the withdrawal of a sum or sums
of money from the treasury of the United States, to be applied in satisfaction of disputed or
controverted claims against the United States”).
It is not entirely clear whether individual legislators might, in lieu of Congress itself,
be enjoined to vote for an appropriation necessary to satisfy a federal judgment.  The prospects
for obtaining enforceable injunctive relief against individual members of Congress seem,
however, rather dim.  Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 278-80 (1990) (noting the
relevance of both the Speech or Debate Clause and the doctrine of legislative immunity to the
range of remedies available against legislators, and holding that use of contempt sanctions
against city council members for failure to pass legislation required by a federal injunction
Justice Jay balked at the notion that the federal courts could
entertain private suits for damages against the federal government
itself, in light of the problem of enforcement:  “in all cases of actions
against States or individual citizens,” he observed, “the National
Courts are supported in all their legal and Constitutional
proceedings and judgments, by the arm of the Executive power of the
United States; but in cases of actions against the United States,
there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid.”94  
The obstacles to enforcement of judgments against a sovereign
may not, however, be wholly practical in nature.  It may be
constitutionally impossible for a court to compel a sovereign to honor
a judgment.  Consider the tortured history of the Court of Claims, a
specialized court created by Congress to hear a wide range of money
claims, including contractual claims, against the United States.95
Prior to creation of this court, the Supreme Court had held that no
money judgment can be executed against the United States until
Congress has appropriated the necessary sum from the Treasury.96
No court, however, can compel Congress to make the necessary
appropriation.97  Nor can Congress bind itself to do so:  burdened in
22 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
constituted an abuse of equitable discretion).  I am indebted to Richard Fallon for his thoughts
on this question.
98 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-12, at 361, 364 (3d ed.
2000) (categorizing money judgments rendered by the Court of Claims against the United
States as “imperfectly enforceable” and “entirely dependent upon subsequent legislative
action”); supra note 97 (citing cases).
99 See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 552-58 (discussing the history of the Court of Claims).
100 See id. at 554-56 (discussing the Court’s earlier holdings regarding the constitutional
status of the Court of Claims); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 567-81 (1933) (holding
that the Court of Claims was not an Article III court); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697,
702 (1865) (posthumous opinion of Taney, C.J.) (setting forth the previously unpublished
rationale for the Court’s earlier holding in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561
(1865)).
101 See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 531-32, 554 (discussing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438
(1929), and Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933)).
102 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
103 See id. at 569 (discussing Gordon, 117 U.S. at 702).
104 Id. at 570.
this respect with legislative omnipotence, it may always decline to
appropriate, just as it may always choose to repeal any
appropriation that it enacts.  As a result, the Court of Claims is
legally incapable of enforcing its money judgments against the
United States.98  This problem of legal enforceability did not deter
Congress from creating the Court of Claims or from attempting to
designate it a federal court within the meaning of Article III.99
Twice, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of
Claims lacked Article III status,100 and on both occasions, Congress
revised the law in an effort to bring the Court of Claims within the
scope of Article III.101 
In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,102 the Supreme Court finally extended
the Court of Claims official membership in the federal judiciary.  To
reach that result, however, a plurality of the Court found it
necessary to contend with the argument, suggested long ago by Chief
Justice Taney, that the Court of Claims lacks judicial power for
purposes of Article III because the money judgments that it renders
are legally unenforceable and lack effect absent voluntary
compliance on the part of Congress.103  Writing for the plurality,
Justice Harlan acknowledged the problem that “if ability to enforce
judgments were made a criterion of judicial power, no tribunal
created under Article III would be able to assume jurisdiction of
money claims against the United States.”104  The plurality’s response
to this theoretically intractable problem was astonishingly practical,
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105 Id.
106 See id. (questioning whether, in light of Congress’s superior record of actual compliance,
“the capacity to enforce a judgment is always indispensable for the exercise of judicial power”).
as constitutional reasoning goes.  Rather than attempt to argue that
the Court of Claims could enforce its judgments as a matter of law,
Justice Harlan relied instead upon the fact that, as a historical
matter, Congress had refused only fifteen times in seventy years to
pay a judgment of the Court of Claims—a record “surely more
favorable to prevailing parties than that obtaining in private
litigation.”105  In light of the fact that successful plaintiffs were more
likely to obtain actual satisfaction from decisions of the Court of
Claims than from the legally efficacious judgments of other courts
against private parties, the plurality refused to be unduly troubled
by the constitutional unenforceability of money judgments against
the United States.106
The efforts of Congress to confer Article III status upon the Court
of Claims amount in substance to the efforts of an omnipotent
sovereign to make a credible commitment.  It is obviously in the
federal government’s best interest to encourage individuals to
contract with the United States as willingly as they would with
ordinary private parties.  The alternative is costly:  potential
contracting parties can be expected to demand a risk premium in
their dealings with their government to compensate them for the
possibility that Congress will exercise its inalienable sovereign
power to repudiate contractual debts.  To put minds at ease,
Congress created the Court of Claims and sought to confer upon it
the irrevocable guarantees of judicial independence contained in
Article III—namely, life tenure and protection from salary
diminution.  
It is tempting to view Glidden as proof that there is nothing a
court can do to enable a sovereign to make credible commitments if
judgments against the sovereign happen to be unenforceable as a
matter of constitutional law.  On this view, neither the existence of
the Court of Claims nor the imprimatur of Article III status
conferred by Glidden does anything to encourage private parties to
contract with the United States on favorable terms.  In substance,
it might be argued, the plurality opinion in Glidden did nothing
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more than point to Congress’s record of voluntary compliance and
ask potential contracting parties to decide for themselves, in light of
this record, whether to take the risk that Congress might exercise its
inalienable sovereign power to repudiate its financial
obligations—and, if so, what premium to demand in exchange for
assuming this risk.  If Congress’s past performance, by itself, is
inadequate to assuage the fears of potential contracting parties,
there is nothing the federal judiciary can do to reduce those fears
any further:  a court cannot bolster the credibility of Congress’s
promises by rendering admittedly unenforceable judgments.
Therefore, the efforts of Congress to interpose the federal courts
between itself and contracting parties amount to nothing more than
an unconvincing attempt by Congress to bootstrap additional
credibility from its own reputation.
This view, it will be argued in Part IV, is mistaken.  There are
conceptual reasons to think that the existence of the Court of
Claims, and its official status as a “true” federal court within the
meaning of Article III, do in fact help to persuade potential
contracting parties that the United States will honor its contractual
commitments.  More generally, Part IV argues that a court can
enable a sovereign to make credible commitments even if
constitutional rules or practical considerations render the sovereign
incapable of making binding or irrevocable commitments.  Before it
can be explained how courts can help sovereigns to make credible
commitments even in the face of constitutional barriers, however, we
must first identify the types of commitment problems that
sovereigns confront, and that courts may be capable of solving.  To
that end, the next part of this Article proposes and illustrates two
analytical distinctions—a distinction between effective and
persuasive commitments, on the one hand, and between the
problems of overcommitment and undercommitment, on the other.
III.  A TYPOLOGY OF COMMITMENTS AND COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
A. EFFECTIVE VERSUS PERSUASIVE COMMITMENTS
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his available options.”); Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 20, at 1936-38, 1938 n.15 (distinguishing
Social scientists have resorted to a few paradigmatic examples to
illustrate why individuals might wish to restrict their own options.
Ulysses tied himself to the mast so that he might experience the
song of the sirens without also dooming himself.107  Military leaders
have burned their own bridges and sunk their own ships to prevent
even the thought of retreat and thereby increase the likelihood of
victory.108  Other examples are decidedly less glorious, but perhaps
more familiar to the average person.  I may want to lose weight, but
realize that, once I am hungry, I will eat indiscriminately, so I order
my meals in advance and keep no fattening foods readily
available.109  I do not want to drive while intoxicated, but I am afraid
that I may attempt to do so anyway once I have consumed a few too
many drinks, so I hand my keys to the host immediately upon my
arrival.110  Though I might enjoy driving on both sides of the road, I
would willingly commit myself, and everyone else, to drive on only
one side.  Indeed, I might even prefer to specify a particular side of
the road.111
These examples all share a common structure:  there exists some
valuable end that cannot be achieved unless we stay the course (or
agree upon the same course), but we know in advance that we will
be sorely tempted to stray (or find ourselves unable to coordinate).
As a result, we seek in advance to limit our future options, or to
“precommit” ourselves.112  Thomas Schelling has thus characterized
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between “internal” and “external” commitments, but adhering deliberately to the conventional
terminology of “commitment” and “precommitment”); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 636-43
(discussing constitutional precommitment strategies).
113 Schelling, supra note 109, at 1.  Schelling defines “anticipatory self-command” as
follows:
[A] person in evident possession of her faculties and knowing what she is
talking about will rationally seek to prevent, to compel, or to alter her own
later behavior—to restrict her own options in violation of what she knows
will be her preference at the time the behavior is to take place.
Id.
114 ELSTER, supra note 2, at 24-45; see also ELSTER, supra note 19, at 65-86 (using both
time-inconsistency and endogenous preference change to explain why choices may conflict over
time).
115 See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 111, at 80 (arguing that the point of legal rules is to
“constrain individuals’ choices of strategy in order to produce a better outcome than would
have resulted from unconstrained choices”); RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 140 (1999) (describing establishment of a constitution
as “a massive act of coordination”).
deliberate precommitment as “anticipatory self-command.”113  As for
the reasons why people seek to precommit themselves, Jon Elster
uses the concept of “time-inconsistency” to describe conflict between
what we wish to accomplish now and what we may choose to do
later,114 while Russell Hardin identifies “coordination” as the
imperative that leads us to bind ourselves with legal rules and
constitutions.115
Not only individuals, but also governments, experience problems
of time-inconsistency and coordination.  A familiar example is that
of a legislature that wishes to restrain its spending habits.  On the
one hand, efforts to reduce spending are likely to encounter a
coordination problem:  each legislator may agree that it would be
best to reduce overall spending, but no particular legislator is willing
to abandon the pork-barrel projects that favor his or her own
constituents.  On the other hand, the legislators may also face a
problem of time-inconsistency:  they may fear, for good reason, that
they will succumb later to profligate spending habits that they wish
now to forswear.
Time-inconsistency and coordination are not, however, the only
reasons why actors make commitments.  Often we are motivated to
make commitments not to regulate our own behavior, but to
persuade others to behave a particular way. All of the examples
described above concern situations in which actors must commit
themselves effectively:  that is, the actors in question cannot achieve
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their ends unless they actually confine themselves to a particular
course of action.  It is often the case, however, that actors merely
seek to commit themselves credibly:  their goals do not require that
they actually behave a certain way, but rather that they convince
others that they will behave that way.  Thus, for instance, I cannot
succeed at losing weight unless I actually prevent myself from binge
eating, but I can succeed at borrowing money from others if I merely
persuade them that I will repay the debt.  It may be that the only
way for me to convince others that I will honor my debts is to make
a commitment that actually forces me to make payments.  But the
opposite may instead be true:  there may be some difference between
a commitment that looks binding to others and one that will in fact
constrain me to act a certain way.  In the eighteenth century, for
example, Sir Robert Walpole saved the Bank of England from
collapse by introducing the concept of a “sinking fund,” the purpose
of which was not to repay the national debt, but rather to convince
the public that it would be repaid.116
To distinguish between these two types of situations is to contrast
what might be called effective and persuasive commitments.  In the
first type of situation, actors cannot achieve their ends unless they
actually refrain from certain behavior.  In such cases, commitments
must actually be binding, or effective, in order for actors to
accomplish their goals.  In the second type of situation, by contrast,
the goal of making a commitment is to persuade others that one’s
ability to perform certain acts is impeded.  In such cases,
commitments need only be credible, or persuasive, to fulfill their
purpose.  Actors do not make persuasive commitments for the
purpose of actually constraining themselves.  They may in fact
prefer to fool others—to convey the impression that they have
restrained themselves, while remaining free in reality to do as they
choose.  One makes an effective commitment in order to restrain
oneself, whereas one makes a persuasive commitment in order to
persuade others that one is restrained.  To distinguish the two types
of commitment, one must ask whose behavior a particular
28 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
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business community and local residents).
119 See id. at 110-17 (describing the deliberate revocability and ambiguity of China’s legal
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success therefore rests upon the ongoing reaction of local residents, foreign investors, and
other states to China’s actions).
120 See id. at 111 (characterizing China’s management of Hong Kong as an “ongoing trade-
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commitment is intended to influence:  the intent of an effective
commitment is to influence one’s own behavior at a later time,
whereas the intent of a persuasive commitment is to influence
someone else’s behavior.  We might say, therefore, that effective
commitments are self-regarding in character, whereas persuasive
commitments are other-regarding in character.117
Because the two types of commitments serve different purposes,
they also entail wholly different criteria of success.  An effective
commitment is successful if it imposes actual constraint upon the
commitment-maker; a persuasive commitment is successful if others
believe that it imposes actual constraint—that is, if the commitment
is credible.  In the case of effective commitments, it is irrelevant to
the commitment-maker whether others find the commitment
credible; actual efficacy is the only measure of success.  In the case
of persuasive commitments, only credibility matters; to the extent
that such a commitment actually constrains the commitment-maker,
that constraint is the unwanted price that the commitment-maker
must pay for credibility.
Consider, for example, China’s commitment to grant Hong Kong
a substantial measure of self-rule—a commitment made to prevent
mass emigration and capital flight, if not also to make the prospect
of reunification less frightening to Taiwan.118  To the extent that the
commitment lacks credibility, China jeopardizes the value of its
prize territory and does nothing to encourage Taiwanese
reunification.119  Yet Chinese interests are also frustrated, however,
to the extent that this commitment actually prevents China from
meddling in Hong Kong’s political affairs at will.120  In this situation,
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the Chinese commitment to Hong Kong is persuasive in character,
because it is intended to reassure residents and investors.  The
success of this commitment, in turn, can be measured by the extent
to which it provides such reassurance without actually constraining
Beijing.
The distinction drawn thus far between effective and persuasive
commitments has hinged upon the intent of the actor making the
commitment, and not upon the actual result of the commitment.
Logically speaking, however, a commitment can be characterized
either on the basis of the goals that it is intended to serve, or on the
basis of the consequences that it actually produces.  Under an intent-
based approach, for example, a commitment made with the goal of
persuading others, but without the goal of actually binding the actor,
would be characterized as a persuasive commitment, regardless of
whether it actually persuades anyone or constrains the actor.  Under
a result-based approach, by contrast, a commitment that both
persuades others and constrains the actor would be characterized as
both persuasive and effective, regardless of what the actor had in
mind when making it.
To see the difference between the two approaches, imagine that
the world community has imposed sanctions on a rogue state for
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.  The rogue state would
prefer to keep its arms but, in order to end the sanctions, commits
itself to disarmament by actually destroying its weapons-making
facilities and materials.  However, because other countries cannot
verify to their own satisfaction that the relevant facilities and
materials have been destroyed, they continue to impose sanctions.
If one labels commitments according to their underlying intent, the
rogue state’s commitment ought to be characterized as a persuasive
one, because the rogue state’s true goal was to persuade the world
community that it no longer poses a threat, not to constrain itself.
If one instead labels commitments according to their actual results,
however, the commitment should be deemed an effective one, not a
persuasive one:  it would be irrelevant that the rogue state’s actions
failed to have their desired persuasive impact, and indeed, backfired
by imposing unwanted constraint.
From a strategic perspective, at least, there is good reason to
attach greater weight to the goals and incentives of the commitment-
30 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
121 Cf., e.g., JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 15 (2d ed. 2002) (defining
“asymmetric information” as a “situation where economic agents do not all have the same
information,” and observing that “[t]his is of course the actual situation in any real economy”);
JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 61, 219 (1994) (defining “private
information,” in the context of game theory, as information that is known only by a particular
player, and noting that players in real-life games of strategy “generally have different
information” about the uncertainties that they face).
maker than to the actual consequences of the commitment itself.
Simply put, a commitment made for the purpose of persuading
others cannot be trusted to the same extent as a commitment made
for the purpose of constraining the commitment-maker.  A
commitment that is intended to be effective may be prone to
unintended failure but is sincere in nature:  though success cannot
necessarily be guaranteed, the commitment-maker’s incentive is to
make the commitment as effective as possible.  A commitment that
is intended to persuade, by contrast, is manipulative in nature and
potentially ineffective by design.  An actor who makes a persuasive
commitment is likely to know more about the actual consequences
of his actions than others do,121 and has reasons to exploit this
informational advantage by fashioning a commitment that is less
constraining than it appears to others.  By distinguishing
commitments according to their underlying intent, we distinguish
situations that are prone to deception from those that are not.
In practice, persuasive and effective commitments are likely to be
intertwined in ways that make them difficult to distinguish.  First,
actors have every reason to disguise their persuasive commitments
as effective commitments:  the more effective a commitment appears
to be, the more persuasive it will be.  Second, persuasiveness may
demand effectiveness:  the only way to make a commitment
persuasive may be to make the commitment effective.  Third,
commitments may sometimes be made for mixed motives:  one may
seek both to bind oneself and to persuade others that one is bound.
For example, Congress has both self-regarding and other-regarding
reasons for wanting to restrain itself from engaging in wanton deficit
spending.  On the other hand, the cost of public borrowing decreases
if foreign investors can be persuaded that the United States is
committed to borrowing less; on the other hand, an actual reduction
in public borrowing will dampen interest rates and thereby promote
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domestic economic growth, regardless of what foreign investors
think.
Efforts to solve collective action problems,122 in particular, are
likely to combine both persuasive and effective commitment-making
in a tangled way.  Many problems can only be solved, and many
goals can only be achieved, by coordinated effort on the part of many
actors.  Given the opportunity, however, individual actors may be
tempted to shirk their own contributions and to rely parasitically on
the efforts of others—that is, to become what economists call free
riders.123  In such situations, some degree of effective commitment is
required if the common goal is to be achieved:  highways cannot be
built, for example, unless people effectively commit themselves to
pay the necessary taxes.  To secure the necessary effective
commitments from others, each actor offers a persuasive
commitment:  I persuade you to commit to paying taxes by making
a commitment to pay taxes as well.  Of course, each actor would
prefer to give merely a persuasive commitment while others give
effective commitments:  I would prefer a system in which others are
actually bound to pay taxes, yet I can escape paying.  No one,
however, wishes to play the fool by exchanging an effective
commitment for a basket of empty promises.  The solution, then, is
for everyone to commit to arrangements that prevent cheating, as in
the form of a government that imprisons tax evaders.  To be sure,
commitments may not always be as effective as they appear:  for
example, the tax code to which we commit may contain generous
loopholes that deliberately favor me in ways that are not obvious to
you.  Even so, the persuasive commitment that I make must at least
appear effective to you if it is to do its job of persuading you to make
an effective commitment.  If it proves impossible for me to deceive
you, then I may have no choice but to make a persuasive
commitment that is also, in fact, effective.
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B. THE PROBLEMS OF UNDERPERSUASIVE AND OVEREFFECTIVE
COMMITMENT
Both the plight of the English and French monarchies in the
seventeenth century and the more recent history of the Court of
Claims illustrate the same type of commitment problem—namely,
the difficulty of making credible, or persuasive, commitments.
Though this problem affects a broad range of ordinary economic
actors,124 it is harder for sovereigns to solve.  Like other economic
actors, sovereigns require capital, goods, and services, but they are
unlikely to obtain the desired quantity and quality of such things
without the voluntary participation of private parties.125  Private
parties may be reluctant, however, to deal with a sovereign that
cannot credibly commit to honor its end of a bargain.  Ordinarily,
private parties can render their commitments credible by making
them legally binding and therefore eligible for enforcement by the
sovereign.  But sovereign enforcement is not a highly credible option
for the sovereign itself, for reasons both logical and practical.  
First, as discussed at the outset of this Article, the paradox of
omnipotence makes it difficult, as a logical matter, for a sovereign to
impose limits on itself, much less to enforce those limits.  Second, it
is not clear how the sovereign can be trusted, as a practical matter,
to police itself.  The problem is an age-old one:  quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?126  Thus, even if the sovereign somehow solves the paradox
of omnipotence and manages to bind itself legally with its own laws,
it is not clear why private parties should, as a practical matter, trust
the sovereign to honor its commitments.  As history has
demonstrated, not even the threat of retaliation over repeat play
may be enough to deter a sovereign from repudiating its
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obligations.127  The risk that the sovereign will do so is reason for
private parties to demand a premium in their dealings with the
sovereign or perhaps to refuse to deal at all.  In such situations, the
challenge for the sovereign is to convince others that it will make
good on its promises—that is, to commit credibly. 
An obvious solution for the sovereign, but one with equally
obvious limitations, is to submit to an even higher sovereign
authority.  Just as individuals can form a government with power to
enforce their commitments, governments can form a union with
power to do the same.  As Alec Stone Sweet and Martin Shapiro
have suggested,128 federalism can be understood as a way in which
sovereigns solve collective action problems—from the lowering of
trade barriers to the provision of military defense—by instituting a
higher authority capable of enforcing their commitments to one
another.  There necessarily comes a point, however, beyond which
one can no longer pass the buck upward.  Even if, for example,
efforts toward free trade and collective security were to culminate in
a global government, there would then arise the question of how that
global government could itself make credible commitments.
The inability of an actor to commit itself adequately in the eyes
of others might be called the problem of underpersuasive
commitment, or (for purposes of brevity) undercommitment.  It
should be apparent that this type of commitment problem arises
only when actors seek to make persuasive commitments:  because
effective commitments are not intended to influence the beliefs of
others, it is irrelevant whether they are credible to others.  The
problem of underpersuasive commitment ought to be distinguished
from what might be called the problem of ineffective
commitment—that is, the actual inability of an actor to bind itself in
an effective way.  Problems of ineffective commitment can be of
genuine concern for sovereigns as well as for individuals:  a
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government that wishes to manage its finances in a prudent
manner, for example, may nevertheless lack any effective means of
preventing itself from overspending.
As noted above, persuasiveness and effectiveness often exist in
tandem but need not always do so.  A commitment may be
underpersuasive because it is ineffective:  a commitment that
patently fails to restrain the commitment-maker is unlikely to
induce much in the way of reliance.  If it is widely known, for
example, that the King of England cannot prevent himself from
reneging upon debts, his commitments will not be terribly credible.
A commitment may, however, appear more or less effective than it
actually is.  An ineffective commitment can still be persuasive if its
ineffectiveness can be concealed or is not evident to others.
Alternatively, an actor may be capable of binding itself but incapable
of demonstrating that fact to the satisfaction of others, as in the case
of the rogue state that cannot prove it has disarmed.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies a species of commitment
problem that is perhaps less obvious but of considerable practical
significance.  Imagine a family law regime under which divorce is
illegal under any circumstances and adultery is a felony that carries
a mandatory sentence of imprisonment.  A successful marriage
requires substantial investment, and neither partner may be willing
to make the necessary investment if each fears that the other will
break the commitment and leave for a more attractive
opportunity.129  That is, undercommitment is a potential impediment
to a successful marriage.  Draconian divorce and adultery laws may
alleviate this problem by rendering marital commitments highly
credible.  At the same time, however, such laws may discourage
people from making marital commitments in the first place,
precisely because they so thoroughly exclude all other future
possibilities—including, for example, the possibility of making a new
marital commitment to a different person after a previous marriage
has irretrievably failed for unforeseen reasons beyond one’s own
control.  Commitments that cannot be broken or modified for any
reason are risky because they can limit one’s freedom of action in
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ways that prove unexpectedly onerous or costly in light of unforeseen
circumstances.  In other words, actors may experience a fear of
overeffective commitment, or overcommitment—of becoming
unexpectedly or unacceptably constrained if they choose to commit.
This fear may discourage rational actors from committing in the first
place. 
Like the problem of underpersuasive commitment, the problem
of overeffective commitment affects sovereigns as well as
individuals.  For instance, Europe’s existing nation-states might be
said to face both problems in deciding whether to deepen their
commitments to the European Union, as ratification of the now-
moribund Constitution for Europe would have entailed.130  On the
one hand, to the extent that membership in the E.U. offers
prosperity, security, and influence, the obvious way for member
states to heighten these benefits is to integrate more closely.131  On
the other hand, member states fear the loss of their own sovereignty
and the creation of “an identity-smothering United States of
Europe.”132  Insofar as the member states have defined their
commitments to the E.U. in legal terms, it is not surprising that
European courts have been required to chart a path between the
twin perils of underpersuasive commitment and overeffective
commitment.  National courts have clashed repeatedly with the
European Court of Justice over the reach of E.U. law and, in
particular, the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz—namely, who has
the authority to define the limits of the E.U.’s authority.133
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Predictably, the European Court of Justice has fought to establish
the supremacy and domestic enforceability of E.U. law,134 while
national courts have resisted the notion that the E.C.J. alone is
entitled to decide the extent of the member states’ legal subjugation
to the E.U.135  By alleviating fears of overeffective commitment,
however, the recalcitrance of the national courts may actually
facilitate further commitment by the member states.  The knowledge
that national courts will perform a sanity check on the actions of the
E.U.—together, perhaps, with some reassurance that the E.C.J.
itself will police the outer limits of E.U. power136—may render the
prospect of closer integration less threatening to national political
actors and therefore more palatable.137
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141 Id. at 626-50.
142 As the Chief Justice observed, the gifts that established the college were
donations to education; donations, which any government must be disposed
rather to encourage than to discountenance.  It requires no very critical
examination of the human mind, to enable us to determine, that one great
inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by the giver, that the
disposition he makes of them is immutable.  It is probable, that no man
ever was, and that no man ever will be, the founder of a college, believing
at the time, that an act of incorporation constitutes no security for the
institution; believing, that it is immediately to be deemed a public
institution, whose funds are to be governed and applied, not by the will of
the donor, but by the will of the legislature.
Id. at 647.
143 Martin Shapiro, Introduction to Charles Warren, The Charles River Bridge Case, 3
GREEN BAG 2d 75, 76 (1999).
For an example closer to home, the Supreme Court’s decision in
the Charles River Bridge Case138 starkly illustrates why it is
necessary for sovereigns to steer a course between
undercommitment and overcommitment and how courts may help
them to do so.  The stage for the Charles River Bridge dispute was
set by an earlier case, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,139
in which the Court had tackled the problem of sovereign
undercommitment.  That case involved legislative efforts by New
Hampshire to assert control over Dartmouth College, which had
been privately founded and owed its corporate existence to a charter
granted in colonial times by the British Crown.140  The trustees of
the college argued, and the Court agreed, that the charter
constituted a binding contract with the sovereign, and that New
Hampshire’s efforts to amend the charter by legislation therefore
violated the Contract Clause.141  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that failure to regard such charters as binding
upon the sovereign would only deter the kind of philanthropy that
had initially established Dartmouth College.142  That is, the Court
explicitly grasped that failure to hold the sovereign to its
commitments would only discourage highly desirable behavior on
the part of private actors.
As Martin Shapiro has explained, the Court’s decision in
Dartmouth College proved an economic boon to the states.143  In the
38 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 In Shapiro’s words:
[I]f your riches consist in your capacity to make legal promises of things
like monopoly privileges, then you are only as rich as the confidence others
have that you will or must keep your promises. Where a sovereign makes
promises by law, precisely because he is sovereign and they are law, the
promises may be broken.  The sovereign, of course, may repeal or amend
his laws at any time.  Thus the paradox that a sovereign’s law-making
capacities are a potentially rich development resource for government but
also one of little practical value.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 76-77.
immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the federal government and
the states alike were poor in land and tax revenue.144  Even the
western lands owned by the United States were relatively worthless
without the necessary infrastructure to transport persons and
goods.145  To their advantage, these financially impoverished
sovereigns did possess “the greatest development resource of all
governments”—namely, the power to make laws, which includes the
ability to grant corporate charters and monopolies in exchange for
private investment in infrastructure.146  A sovereign that is
incapable of making credible commitments, however, is also
incapable of tapping the investment-generating potential of its own
lawmaking powers:  one is unlikely to invest in infrastructure if
there is nothing to prevent the sovereign from confiscating or
destroying the value of one’s investment.147  By signaling that the
federal judiciary would force states to honor whatever charters they
issued, the Dartmouth College decision made it possible for states to
commit themselves credibly and “thus at a stroke . . . filled the state
treasuries.”148
The Court’s solution in Dartmouth College to the problem of
undercommitment, however, placed the states in a new quandary.
Dartmouth College had been decided in a time of rapid technological
advance, and no sooner had states issued charters to secure the
private construction of turnpikes and canals than they wished to
encourage railroad expansion instead.149  The states needed the
freedom to make new commitments that would promote new forms
of investment, but their earlier commitments threatened to block the
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151 Charles Warren, The Charles River Bridge Case, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 78, 79 (1999)
[hereinafter Warren, Part I].  The facts recounted here are drawn from Charles Warren’s
exhaustive account of the case, which varies in minor details from the Court’s own summary.
Compare id. at 78-91, and Charles Warren, The Charles River Bridge Case, Part II, 3 GREEN
BAG 2d 203 (2000) [hereinafter Warren, Part II], with Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v.
Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 536-39 (1837).  For a discussion of the
decision’s historical context, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 130-39 (1977).
152 Warren, Part I, supra note 151, at 79.
153 Id. at 79-82.
154 Id. at 84-85.
way.  If the charters previously issued to turnpike and canal
companies were construed as conferring monopoly privileges, the
owners of the old infrastructure could blackmail or exclude any
railroads that sought to compete.150  The states were thus caught
between the Scylla of undercommitment and the Charybdis of
overcommitment.  On the one hand, to give the old commitments
their intended scope might preclude the states from making new
commitments.  On the other hand, to permit the states simply to
repudiate their old commitments to the turnpike and canal operators
would ruin the credibility of any new commitments that might be
offered to the railroad entrepreneurs.
Such was the dilemma that the Court confronted in the Charles
River Bridge Case.  Early in its colonial history, Massachusetts had
granted to Harvard College the right to operate a ferry service
between Charlestown and Boston.151  Over a century later, the state
issued a corporate charter to John Hancock and others that
authorized them to build a bridge in place of the ferry, but also
obligated them to make annual payments to Harvard to compensate
for the loss of income.152  Unlike the ferry that it had replaced, the
Charles River Bridge proved enormously profitable, but the extent
of its profits roused the ire of the public, which clamored for a bridge
that would be free of tolls.153  In response, the state legislature
eventually chartered the competing Warren Bridge, subject to the
condition that it would become a free bridge once its investors had
recouped a specified return.154  Realizing that their investment
would soon be rendered worthless, the proprietors of the Charles
River Bridge challenged the state’s issuance of the Warren Bridge
40 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
155 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 539.
156 See id. at 549 (describing the Charles River Bridge charter); id. at 536 (quoting early
legislation that granted Harvard “the liberty and power” to operate ferry service); Warren,
Part I, supra note 151, at 79 (quoting the resolution of the General Court of Massachusetts
Bay Colony that “the ferry between Boston and Charlestown is granted to the College”).
157 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 420; id. at 536  (Story, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 18 (1991) (noting the view held at the time by “many prominent
lawyers, including Joseph Story and Alexander Hamilton,” that monopoly rights were
“essential to economic development” and “should be implied in charters for works of public
improvements”); id. at 313 (observing that toll bridges are characterized by high fixed costs
that can jeopardize their economic viability in the face of competition, and describing Daniel
Webster’s argument to the Court on behalf of the Charles River Bridge to this effect).
charter as an unconstitutional impairment of their own charter.155
Neither the original colonial grant of ferry service to Harvard nor
the Charles River Bridge charter, however, contained any explicit
grant of monopoly privileges with respect to the river crossing.156
The implications of the case for the nation’s economic
development were not lost on the Court.  Chief Justice Taney,
writing for the majority, and Justice Story, in dissent, agreed that
the state’s ability to make commitments in the form of charters was
critical to securing needed infrastructure.157  They clashed instead
over what reading of the state’s existing commitments would best
ensure the future flow of private investment.  Justice Story argued
emphatically that failure to protect private investors from repeated
state efforts to confer the same right of way would have ruinous
effects upon future investment:
No man will hazard his capital in any enterprise, in
which, if there be a loss, it must be borne exclusively by
himself; and if there be success, he has not the slightest
security of enjoying the rewards of that success for a
single moment.  If the government means to invite its
citizens to enlarge the public comforts and conveniences,
to establish bridges, or turnpikes, or canals, or railroads,
there must be some pledge, that the property will be
safe; that the enjoyment will be co-extensive with the
grant:  and that success will not be the signal of a
general combination to overthrow its rights, and to take
away its profits.158
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In Story’s view, no compromise was possible between the
alternatives of promise-breaking and promise-keeping.  If the
sovereign’s existing commitments were rendered worthless, so too
were its future commitments.  There could be no point, in turn, to
preserving the sovereign’s ability to make worthless commitments.
The majority of the Court, by comparison, was loathe to construe
existing charters as conferring monopoly privileges for fear of
rendering the states incapable of promoting infrastructural
improvements.  Warned Chief Justice Taney:
Let it once be understood that such charters carry with
them [monopoly privileges]; and you will soon find the
old turnpike corporations awakening from their sleep,
and calling upon this Court to put down the
improvements which have taken their place.  The
millions of property which have been invested in rail
roads and canals, upon lines of travel which had been
before occupied by turnpike corporations, will be put in
jeopardy.  We shall be thrown back to the improvements
of the last century, and obliged to stand still, until the
claims of the old turnpike corporations shall be satisfied;
and they shall consent to permit these states to avail
themselves of the lights of modern science, and to
partake of the benefit of those improvements which are
now adding to the wealth and prosperity, and the
convenience and comfort, of every other part of the
civilized world.159
Taney found room to maneuver, however, between the problem of
undercommitment that Story found insurmountable and the
prospect of overcommitment that could choke economic development.
The solution was a lawyer’s trick—a rule of contractual
interpretation, drawn surreptitiously from the civil law tradition,
that ambiguities in a contract with the sovereign would be construed
in favor of the sovereign.160  No doubt the proprietors of the Charles
42 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
of the rule).  This “canon of construction disfavoring implied governmental obligations in public
contracts” has spawned what is known today as the unmistakability doctrine:  any contractual
surrender of sovereign power, the Court has explained, must be expressed in “unmistakable
terms.”  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871-72, 874 (1996) (plurality opinion
of Souter, J.) (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
52 (1986)).
161 See Warren, Part I, supra note 151, at 82 (describing a joint legislative committee’s
conclusion that construction of a new bridge would impair the charter rights of the old bridge).
162 Id. at 85.
163 Subsequent decisions of the Taney Court never wholly repudiated the principle that a
state would be bound by an express grant of monopoly privileges, but nevertheless forced
investors to take ever greater care in their dealings with states.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note
158, at 25-27 (discussing cases in which the Taney Court narrowly construed grants of
monopoly and “applied every available argument to permit states to withdraw from previous
entanglements with private corporations”); id. at 33-35 (concluding that, by the end of the
nineteenth century, the notion that corporate charters amounted to contracts with the state
that conferred “unique privileges” was itself “dead”).
River Bridge—and probably the Massachusetts legislature as
well161—believed from the outset that the first bridge’s charter
necessarily implied some form of monopoly that would exclude the
construction of a second bridge a mere 260 feet away.162
Nevertheless, the first charter’s failure to confer a monopoly in
unmistakable terms proved fatal to the argument.  In turn, this
narrow construction of the Charles River Bridge charter left
countless holders of similar charters—bridge, canal, and turnpike
operators alike—without means to prevent state legislatures from
granting whatever new monopoly privileges might be necessary to
attract the investment of railroad entrepreneurs in the next wave of
transportation infrastructure.
The Court’s decision thus placed potential contracting parties on
notice that only an explicit promise of monopoly privileges would
suffice to guarantee such privileges.  But at the same time, it left
potential contracting parties with no reason to doubt that an explicit
promise would indeed be enforced against the sovereign.  This
means of escape from the old charters was, by its nature, not one
that could be repeated, for careful investors could now avoid the fate
of the Charles River Bridge by insisting upon an explicit statement
of their monopoly rights.163  For the very same reason, however, the
Court’s decision in the Charles River Bridge Case did little to deter
such investors from bargaining with the states in the future.  In the
meantime, and with the benefit of hindsight, the states had the
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166 Credit belongs to Matt Spitzer for aptly dubbing this a “Goldilocks problem”.
167 Shapiro, supra note 143, at 77.
opportunity to learn a valuable lesson—namely, that it would
behoove them to think twice before conferring monopolies of long or
indefinite duration.164
IV.  COURTS AS COMMITMENT MANAGERS
A. HOW COURTS CALIBRATE THE EXTENT OF SOVEREIGN COMMITMENT
As a practical matter, the problem of sovereign overcommitment
is easier for courts to solve than the problem of undercommitment.
Undercommitment can defy judicial solution if, for example, a court
is simply unable and therefore unwilling to enforce commitments
against a coordinate branch of government, as Chief Justice Jay
candidly confessed in Chisholm.165  By comparison, when a court
simply declares that the government is free of any legal
commitment, there is nothing to enforce and thus no possibility of
disobedience:  the problem of overcommitment is cured with a single
stroke.  The most challenging task that courts face, however, is to
solve the problem of overcommitment without also creating a
problem of undercommitment, and vice versa.  Like Goldilocks in
search of the perfect porridge,166 judges must labor to find a happy
medium.
If, for example, the Supreme Court’s only goal in Charles River
Bridge had been to liberate the states from their previous
commitments, it could simply have limited or overruled Dartmouth
College.  The Court’s actual task, however, demanded greater
finesse.  As Shapiro puts it:  “How could the judges arrange it so that
the government could break its old promises while still retaining its
capacity to make new ones that would be believed?”167  To solve both
types of commitment problems that sovereigns face, courts must
perform a balancing act:  they must enable the sovereign to make
credible commitments, without also rendering the sovereign
ineffectual by excessively restricting its freedom of action.
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168 See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818-21 (1879) (holding that the Contract Clause
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169 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
170 U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
One way in which courts can try to achieve this balance is to
distinguish between commitments that encourage desirable
behavior—such as the establishment of private educational
institutions or public lending at favorable interest rates—and should
therefore be judicially enforced, and those that permit undesirable
behavior—such as gambling—which need not be judicially
enforced.168  The constitutional rule that a state cannot contract
away its police power to protect public health, safety, or morals169
enables, if not requires, courts to apply precisely this distinction.  To
allow a state to revoke gambling charters may discourage
subsequent investment in casinos, but that may not be a bad thing
even from the state’s point of view.  Like the Taney Court’s adoption
of a pro-sovereign rule of contractual interpretation, however, this
particular solution is difficult to repeat because other actors can be
expected to learn from the first time that it is used.  Presumably, a
sovereign does not issue a gambling charter in the first place unless
it has concluded that the benefits of the activity—the tax revenues
generated and the jobs created—will outweigh its costs.  A court may
enable the sovereign to change its mind once by releasing it from
such commitments, but once it has been judicially established that
gambling charters are subject to revocation, the sovereign may be
unable to regain the faith of investors should it experience yet
another change of heart.
Another way for courts to strike the necessary balance between
undercommitment and overcommitment is to weigh the importance
and urgency of the sovereign’s reasons for wanting to break a
particular commitment.  This approach underlies the judicially
fashioned constitutional rule that states retain the inalienable
ability to impair contracts to the extent “reasonable and necessary
to serve an important public purpose.”170  Such a rule means in effect
that judicial enforcement of a state commitment turns upon a
judicial assessment of both the importance of the state’s reasons for
breaking the commitment and the availability of other means by
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(arguing that “the rules of constitutional law can be reduced to two basic principles or
tests”—namely, balancing and means-end analysis); SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 128,
at 179 (“Ultimately the rights provisions of all constitutions come down to the proposition that
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which the state might realize its objectives.  Balancing and means-
end analysis of this type is, of course, not unique to Contract Clause
doctrine or even American constitutional jurisprudence; it amounts
instead to a generic approach taken by most courts whenever they
are asked to review governmental action that, on its face, oversteps
constitutional limitations.171
Whichever approach a court adopts, the credibility of the
sovereign’s commitments will rest upon the court’s reputation for
allowing the sovereign to break its commitments only in exceptional
cases:  the more leeway that the court allows the sovereign, the less
credible that the sovereign’s commitments become.  The efficacy of
any judicial solution to the problem of sovereign undercommitment
is likely to depend in substantial part upon the reputation of the
courts.  In particular, for a judicial solution to be effective, the courts
must cultivate a reputation not only for deciding cases involving the
sovereign in an acceptably impartial manner, but also for rendering
judgments that are in fact efficacious. 
Why is the reputation of the judiciary so crucial to solving the
problem of sovereign undercommitment?  The remainder of Part IV
develops the answer to this question in stages.  Part IV.B identifies
the basic strategies available to ordinary actors for making
commitments persuasive.  Part IV.C discusses the extent to which
these strategies are unavailable to sovereigns.  Part IV.D explores
the murky relationship between judicial reputation and judicial
power.  Finally, Part IV.E draws together the strands of the
argument and explains how courts can draw upon their reputation
for rendering fair and efficacious judgments to bolster the credibility
of sovereign commitments.
B. THE BASIC STRATEGIES FOR MAKING PERSUASIVE COMMITMENTS
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considerations other than material self-interest”); MORROW, supra note 121, at 219-20
(discussing how knowledge about a player’s “type”—such as its willingness to wage war as
opposed to its propensity to surrender—will influence an opponent’s choice of strategy); Kreps,
supra note 172, at 92-93, 118-20 (observing that firms and universities cultivate reputations
in order to attract employees and students, respectively).
175 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
176 See FRANK, supra note 129, at 83-84 (observing that a person’s known propensity for
“[s]trong feelings of affection” can influence our beliefs as to that person’s motivations and
capacity for marital commitment); cf. Kreps, supra note 172, at 90-94, 100-31 (arguing that
“corporate culture” can communicate the manner in which a firm will behave in the face of
unforeseen contingencies and thereby help the firm to find and maintain economic
opportunities).
177 E.g., DOUGLAS C. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 303 (1994) (defining “cheap talk” as “a statement that may convey information even
though the statement is costless, nonbinding, and nonverifiable”); MORROW, supra note 121,
At root, there are only a few ways by which one actor can
persuade another that it will honor a commitment, none of which is
foolproof.  One way is to post a bond or offer a hostage—that is, to
surrender something of value that will be forfeited if the
commitment is broken.172  The posting of a bond may simply shift the
risk of being cheated from one party to the other, of course, insofar
as there is no guarantee that the bond itself will be returned.173
Another way is to convey information about type—that is, to signal
one’s innate characteristics and predispositions.174  To revisit an
earlier example,175 one might place more confidence in the marriage
vows of the type of person who falls madly and irrevocably in love
(assuming, of course, that one believes that such types exist and can
be identified).176  If, however, it is too easy for actors to transmit
false and self-serving information about themselves—that is, to
engage in what game theorists call “cheap talk”177—then the
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of sovereign obligations is problematic, if not impossible, and that the absence of such
enforcement dissuades creditors from lending to sovereigns in the first place).
information that they send ceases to be credible.  A final option is
third-party enforcement.  To express a commitment to someone else
in the form of a legally binding contract, enforceable by the
sovereign, is to offer a commitment with at least some credibility.
But as most lawyers know, such enforcement can be costly to obtain
and uncertain in likelihood—so costly and uncertain, perhaps, that
a lawsuit may not be worth the effort.  
These basic strategies need not be wholly distinct or mutually
exclusive.  To rely upon one’s reputation partakes of both bond-
posting and signaling of type:  a reputation conveys information
about one’s type, but it is also a thing of value that can be forfeited
by bad behavior.  Bonds and hostages may be surrendered to a third
party with a reputation for trustworthiness.  Nor must these
strategies make it impossible for a determined actor to break its
commitments.  Contracts may ordinarily be breached upon payment
of damages; even constitutions can be amended by their own terms
or abrogated by revolution.  For these strategies to succeed at the
task of rendering commitments credible, they need only ensure that
commitment-breaking appears highly burdensome and therefore
unlikely. 
C. PERSUASIVE COMMITMENT AND THE PLIGHT OF THE SOVEREIGN
The strategy of third-party enforcement poses unique challenges,
however, when sovereign commitments are involved.178  There is, at
the outset, a conceptual obstacle to be overcome:  how can a
sovereign’s own courts be said to provide third-party enforcement of
the sovereign’s own commitments?  The fragmentation of sovereign
power, accomplished by such mechanisms as federalism and
separation of powers, constitutes an obvious answer.  There is
nothing conceptually implausible or paradoxical about federal
judicial enforcement of commitments made by a state or a coordinate
branch of government.  Indeed, it was the very prospect that the
federal courts would enforce state debts that prompted adoption of
48 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:    
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181 Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), offers a striking example of the
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escape its commitments.  Brand concerned the Indiana legislature’s partial repeal of a law that
purported to grant tenure to schoolteachers who had met specified requirements.  Id. at 101-
04.  The Indiana courts had held that, as a matter of state constitutional law, the legislature
was constitutionally incapable of conferring irrevocable tenure upon the state’s teachers.  Id.
at 114-17 (Black, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the partial repeal of
the teacher tenure law violated the Contract Clause.  Id. at 105-09 (majority opinion).
182 See supra notes 3-18 and accompanying text.
183 See Elster, supra note 108, at 1773 (“A unicameral assembly is too powerful to
precommit itself—it is unable to make itself unable to untie itself from the mast.”) (citing
JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 26 (Michael James et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1999)
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184 See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-48 (1998) (striking down Congress’s efforts
to confer line-item veto power upon the President as a violation of the constitutional scheme
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grounds, portions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction legislation).
the Eleventh Amendment.179  The supremacy of federal law180
ensures, moreover, that states cannot legally abolish their
commitments simply by changing their own laws.181  Nor is it novel
to think that the separation of powers can enable a government to
commit itself.  North and Weingast draw precisely this conclusion
from the ascendancy of Parliament and the courts following the
Glorious Revolution,182 while Jon Elster has credited Jeremy
Bentham, in particular, with the first explicit statement of “the idea
that separation of powers can facilitate political precommitment.”183
It must be noted, however, that a constitutional separation of powers
scheme can instead frustrate efforts by a sovereign to commit itself,
as the Supreme Court has demonstrated in striking down various
efforts by Congress to curtail its own spending habits.184
Even if the fragmentation of sovereign power makes it
conceptually plausible for courts to enforce sovereign commitments,
there remains the question of whether courts are practically capable
of enforcing those commitments.  As argued above, courts
demonstrate obsessive concern with their own legitimacy—that is,
their ability to secure voluntary compliance with their
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decisions—precisely because they lack the instruments of coercion.185
In the absence of assistance from the other branches, some judicial
decisions may lack practical effect.186  A federal court may, at the
extreme, be able to obtain such assistance against a recalcitrant
state:  it is unusual for the President to deploy troops in support of
a federal judgment, but it is not unprecedented.187  Federal
enforcement of federal judgments against the federal government,
however, is another story.  The President cannot logically be
expected to use force against himself, and for him to do so against
Congress would amount to a military coup.  Moreover, even if the
courts could somehow muster coercive power against the political
branches, they remain vulnerable to painful retaliation:  even the
relatively independent Article III judiciary can legally be denied
operational funding, stripped of large swaths of jurisdiction, and
targeted with court-packing and impeachment campaigns.188
D. THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES:  JUDICIAL REPUTATION AND THE
NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER
The practical difficulty of enforcing judgments against another
branch of government—not to mention the possibility of
retaliation—poses two thorny questions for courts.  First, should
courts even attempt to decide cases in which litigants seek judicial
enforcement of commitments made by the other branches? The
relevant considerations will not be exclusively legal or normative, for
a careless response may jeopardize the judiciary’s institutional
interests.  Second, what can courts do to make such commitments
credible, absent any means of enforcement?  Close consideration of
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the Glidden scenario189 suggests that the answer to both questions
may turn precariously upon the reputation of the judiciary.  On the
one hand, in deciding whether to hear cases against the other
branches, the judiciary must aim to preserve its reputation for
rendering efficacious judgments.  Only by protecting its reputation
can the judiciary enhance the credibility of sovereign commitments.
On the other hand, in order to preserve this reputation, the judiciary
must be highly selective as to which sovereign commitments it
chooses to adjudicate in the first place.
There are good institutional reasons for courts to avoid rendering
judgments that lack practical effect.  As a general matter, no legal
system can operate without some degree of voluntary compliance;190
sovereign enforcement is imperfect and consumes finite resources.
But courts that engage in countermajoritarian review of executive
and legislative action are especially dependent upon voluntary
acquiescence, as they have little or no coercive power at their
disposal in confrontations with the elected branches.
There are only two basic ways, in turn, for courts to cultivate such
compliance with their decisions.  The first way is to author
persuasive decisions.  At their best, judges devise compelling legal
and normative arguments that win public sympathy and prove
difficult for political actors to dispute or ignore.  In realpolitik terms,
constitutional theory is therefore of much practical value to courts,
insofar as it elucidates effective rhetorical strategies for winning
acceptance. 
The second way for courts to cultivate compliance is to render
only decisions that are likely to be obeyed.  The underlying logic is
simple.  Absent any real means of enforcement, obedience to judicial
decisionmaking is a political habit.  Judicial decisions not backed by
force are efficacious partly for the same reason that paper money not
backed by gold is valuable:  both are accepted because they are
accepted.  People will not accept intrinsically worthless pieces of
paper in exchange for intrinsically valuable goods and services if
they do not believe that they will be able to exchange those pieces of
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paper for other intrinsically valuable goods and services.  Likewise,
political actors may not obey judicial decisions if they doubt that
other political actors will do the same:  there is little obvious cost to
ignoring the edicts of a court that others already disregard with
impunity.  By contrast, the fact that people do accept paper money
or judicial decisions begets further acceptance.  Judicial power, like
monetary value, is socially constructed.  Indeed, one might conceive
of judicial power as the product of a cooperative equilibrium191:  a
system of judicial dispute resolution may be of value to everyone, but
its efficacy depends upon our own continued obedience.
If political actors learn through experience and observation that
judicial decisions may be revised or ignored without consequence,
the habit of obedience may be broken, just as a cooperative
equilibrium can unravel in the face of defection.  The appearance of
judicial weakness breeds judicial weakness; the appearance of
judicial power breeds judicial power.  And the obvious way for courts
to cultivate the appearance of judicial power is to pick only those
fights that they can win and to decide only those cases in which they
are confident of their practical ability to vindicate the rights of
successful litigants.192  A prudent court might therefore refuse, for
example, to decide so-called “political questions” that could trigger
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conflict with the other branches193 or to render decisions that are
subject to executive or legislative revision.194  The actual existence
of these doctrines, as a matter of judge-made constitutional law,
suggests that the Supreme Court has a more profound grasp of the
necessities of judicial power than it is sometimes prepared to
admit.195
Just as reputation helps courts to obtain acceptance of their
decisions without resort to coercion, reputation can also enable
courts to render sovereign commitments credible—even
commitments that they have no way of enforcing.  If they are to
preserve the very reputation that makes this magic possible,
however, courts must be careful in selecting which commitments
they are prepared to bless.  On the one hand, they cannot be too
harsh upon the sovereign, lest the sovereign balk and jeopardize
their reputation for rendering efficacious judgments.  On the other
hand, they cannot afford to be too lenient upon the sovereign, lest
they jeopardize their reputation for impartiality while leading
creditors and others to conclude that the sovereign can repudiate its
commitments unpredictably or with excessive ease.  The extent to
which this balancing act poses obvious institutional perils to the
judiciary may help to explain the Supreme Court’s reluctance to
conclude—as it ultimately did in Glidden, but only after years of
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prodding by Congress196—that the Court of Claims was a full-fledged
member of the Article III judiciary, and that their reputations would
henceforth be mutually dependent.197
E. ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT FORCE:  THE SUBTLE ARTS OF THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH
Why, then, was a majority of the Court finally willing in Glidden
to stake the federal judiciary’s most valuable yet vulnerable
asset—its reputation—upon the judgments of the Court of Claims?
And what good did the Court achieve by doing so?  Glidden placed
the judiciary in the undeniably awkward position of rendering
judgments that are both legally and practically unenforceable.198  It
is supposedly a truism that, for every right, there must exist a
remedy,199 yet the work of the Court of Claims consists precisely of
deciding rights for which there exists no remedy.  Nevertheless, the
decision was both sensible for the judiciary and advantageous for the
nation.  
From the perspective of the judiciary, Congress’s nearly perfect
record of honoring money judgments meant that the federal courts
risked little damage to their precious reputation for rendering
efficacious judgments.  The Court minimized this risk by acting only
with the benefit and reassurance of hindsight; had it conferred
Article III status upon the Court of Claims from the very outset, it
would have lacked the necessary information upon which to assess
the potential damage to the judiciary’s reputation.
From the sovereign’s point of view, the fact that its contracts and
debts are to be adjudicated by a highly reputable judiciary increases
the credibility of its commitments and thus lowers its costs in
transacting with private parties.  This should be the case, moreover,
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even if the judiciary lacks the formal or practical power to enforce its
judgments against the sovereign.  The willingness of courts to stake
their own valuable reputation upon the sovereign’s voluntary
compliance gives the sovereign’s commitments more credibility than
the sovereign could achieve strictly on the basis of its own good
behavior.  Of the three basic strategies described above for making
commitments credible—bond-posting, type-signaling, and third-
party enforcement200—only the third is unavailable to courts in the
situation posed by Glidden:  insurmountable legal and practical
obstacles preclude the actual enforcement of judgments against an
unconsenting Congress.  A favorable reputation gives courts several
other means by which to bolster the credibility of sovereign
commitments.
First, the judiciary can post its own reputation as a bond for
performance of the sovereign’s obligations. Congress’s own
reputation, by itself, can be expected to allay the fears of potential
contracting partners to a substantial degree.  If, however, Congress
chooses not only to dishonor its debts and contractual obligations,
but to do so in disregard of an Article III court, it sacrifices not only
its own valuable reputation, but also that of the federal courts.  A
prudent sovereign is unlikely, in turn, to want to jeopardize the
reputation of the judiciary.  A judiciary of good repute—one that
elicits voluntary compliance by dint of its reputation—is valuable to
the sovereign not merely because it can bolster the credibility of
sovereign commitments but, more importantly, because it discharges
a crucial sovereign responsibility—that of dispute resolution201—at
minimal cost to the sovereign in enforcement resources or political
support.  It is obviously cheaper to solve divisive conflicts by
adjudication than by show of force.202  The existence of courts willing
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and able to resolve controversial issues can also spare rulers the
political costs of having to confront such issues themselves.203  When
any resolution is bound to antagonize a broad swath of the public,
kings and presidents alike may find it convenient to hide behind the
bench.
Second, a judicial reputation for rendering fair and efficacious
judgments gives private parties reason to expect that the courts will
deliver more of the same in cases involving sovereign commitments.
The mere knowledge that one can sue the United States in a “real”
federal court—the type with a reputation for rendering fair and
efficacious judgments—is likely to shape one’s expectations.  The fact
of Article III adjudication is cheap and reliable information that
one’s legal rights are likely both to be decided impartially and to
receive practical effect.  Some private parties may well infer from the
availability of an Article III forum that the contractual commitments
of the United States will be enforced in much the same way as those
of any other party.  That is, they may (incorrectly) construe the
judiciary’s reputation as evidence of a willingness and ability to
enforce the federal government’s financial commitments.  
More sophisticated actors may realize that a federal court has no
legal or practical power to compel the payment of money judgments
against the United States.  Nevertheless, they too may conclude
from the track record of Article III courts that their legal rights will
be fairly decided and that any judgment they obtain is likely to be
honored.  That is, they may grasp that the Article III judiciary is
profoundly unwilling to decide cases wherein its judgments will be
ignored—so unwilling, in fact, that it will impose limits upon its own
jurisdiction to avoid doing so.204  The fact that the judiciary is willing
to render money judgments against the sovereign signals to private
parties the judiciary’s belief that the sovereign will honor those
judgments.  Moreover, this signal is credible because it is costly for
the judiciary to send false signals:  the courts cannot render sham
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decisions for the sovereign to disregard without also jeopardizing
their own reputation and power.
Third, whatever the legal consequences (or lack thereof) of a
particular judgment, it can be politically awkward for the sovereign
to disregard a well-reasoned decision by a reputable court.  As
constitutional practice in other countries illustrates, political
considerations can be enough to secure sovereign compliance even
with judicial pronouncements that do not purport to be legally
binding.  For example, section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms—commonly known as the “notwithstanding”
clause—empowers a provincial legislature, acting expressly and by
supermajority, to reenact a law that the Canadian Supreme Court
has declared unconstitutional.205  Yet the political unpopularity of
passing laws that have already been declared unconstitutional has
helped to ensure that, outside of Quebec—which has in any event
refused to ratify Canada’s constitution—the notwithstanding clause
has seen actual use only once.206  In the United Kingdom, by
comparison, British courts cannot strike down parliamentary
legislation in the first instance but do have the power, under the
Human Rights Act 1998, to declare such legislation incompatible
with the European Convention on Human Rights.207  Though
Parliament is free to leave the impugned law in force, it is widely
assumed that a declaration of incompatibility will generate sufficient
political pressure to ensure that the law is repealed or amended to
comply with the Convention.208  
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Parliament to take remedial action); Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Development of Human Rights
in Britain under an Incorporated Convention on Human Rights, 1998 PUB. L. 221, 225-29
(discussing practical implications of the rights-protection scheme established by the Human
Rights Act).
In both the Canadian and British examples, there exist perfectly
legal means by which the sovereign can override or ignore what the
courts have decided.  Nevertheless, the act of adjudication by a
reputable court has political ramifications that hinder the sovereign
from doing so.  If it is generally understood that the sovereign is
politically averse to ignoring judicial decisions, courts may be able
to bolster the credibility of the sovereign’s commitments simply by
adjudicating them.  Even if the sovereign retains the legal ability to
repudiate, it is at least somewhat reassuring that the courts will
blow the whistle on such behavior, and that the mere act of
whistleblowing by a reputable court imposes political costs upon the
sovereign.
In sum, it is difficult, but not impossible, for a sovereign to make
persuasive commitments.  In the worst of scenarios, constitutional
barriers and practical considerations alike prevent the sovereign
from binding itself and preclude anything resembling traditional
judicial enforcement.  Even in such cases, a reputable court may be
able to parlay its own reputation into added credibility for the
sovereign’s commitments, as Glidden demonstrates.  That process
entails a certain amount of circularity, however, if not sleight of
hand.  The judiciary preserves its reputation for rendering
efficacious judgments by lending its imprimatur only to
commitments that it knows will be honored.  But those
commitments, in turn, become more credible because the judiciary
has a reputation for rendering efficacious judgments.  Provided that
the courts have taken adequate care of their reputation, the very fact
of judicial involvement signals to private parties that the sovereign’s
commitments are likely to be honored, even if a judgment against
the sovereign cannot be enforced in any traditional sense.  This
signal is credible, in turn, because open disregard of the courts by
the sovereign imposes costs upon the sovereign and the courts alike.
V.  CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTION AS COMMITMENT
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Sovereigns face more than one variety of commitment problem.
Though the problem of underpersuasive commitment, or “credible
commitment,” has monopolized scholarly attention, the potential for
overeffective commitment is of no less practical concern to
sovereigns.  At the root of both problems is a tension between what
appears beneficial or expedient in the short run, and what happens
to be prudent in the long run:  it cannot be assumed that what a
sovereign demands or promises in the short run will prove to be in
the sovereign’s best interests in the long run.  The problem of
undercommitment is particularly acute for sovereigns because, of the
three basic strategies available for making commitments
credible—bond-posting, type-signaling, and third-party
enforcement—the last may be difficult or unavailable for both legal
and practical reasons.  As others have pointed out, it is possible for
constitutional arrangements to remedy the problem by placing
constraints upon the sovereign.  But the reverse is also true:  by
entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities, a
constitution can ordain the paradoxical situation in which the
sovereign has too much power for its own good.  
In the absence of any other authority to which a sovereign might
conceivably respond, it falls upon courts to police—or, more
accurately, to steward—the sovereign’s commitments as best they
can.  The challenges that they face are several.  First, they must
steer a course for the sovereign between overcommitment and
undercommitment.  That is, they must relieve the sovereign from
past commitments that prove crippling, but they must do so without
impairing the sovereign’s ability to make credible commitments in
the future.  Second, they must find ways to bolster the credibility of
the sovereign’s commitments, even when they have no way of
imposing either practical or legal constraints upon the sovereign.
Third, they must accomplish these tasks without undermining the
basis of their own power—namely, their reputation for rendering fair
and efficacious judgments.
The manner in which the Supreme Court has handled these tasks
offers reason for both hope and disappointment.  Nearly two
centuries ago, the Marshall and Taney Courts demonstrated a keen
grasp of the distinction between what a state may wish to do in the
short run, and what is actually in the best interests of the state in
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the long run.  In Dartmouth College and Charles River Bridge, the
Supreme Court approached enforcement of the Contract Clause with
a pragmatic and paternalistic regard for the credibility of sovereign
commitments and the future availability of private capital.  In more
recent times, the Justices have had occasion to remember that the
enforcement of costly commitments is in the sovereign’s own “long-
run interest as a reliable contracting partner,”209 and that expansion
of the sovereign’s opportunities for reneging can serve only to
“undermin[e] the Government’s credibility at the bargaining table
and increas[e] the cost of its engagements.”210  
Paternalistic concern for the sovereign’s own long-run interest
constitutes a particularly compelling justification for judicial
enforcement of sovereign commitments, insofar as public officials
with an eye to reelection cannot be relied upon to pursue
commitment-keeping policies that yield dividends in the long run but
are costly in the short run.  This potential disparity between what
elected officials may proclaim to be in the public interest and what
is actually in the public interest renders it both unnecessary and
unwise for a court to imply—as the Supreme Court did in United
States Trust211—that its goal in policing such commitments is to
prevent the sovereign from pursuing its self-interest.  The conflict in
such cases is not simply between the interests of private parties who
deal with the sovereign on the one hand, and those of the sovereign
on the other.  Rather, to the extent that the credibility of sovereign
commitments is at stake, the interests of the private plaintiff and
the sovereign coincide.  
To deny a child candy is not necessarily to act against the child’s
self-interest.  The same can be said when a sovereign is forced to
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keep its promises.  The current Court, however, has proven fervently
and dramatically permissive in at least one damaging respect.  Its
affinity for the idea of sovereign immunity and reluctance to
interpose the federal courts between government and citizen are by
now well documented.212  Yet the sweep of sovereign immunity
doctrine may well do the sovereign more harm than good.  The
“dignity and respect” to which sovereigns are entitled, we are told,
help to justify their immunity from suit.213  But what sovereign
enjoys “dignity and respect” when it dishonors its commitments and
refuses to defend what it has done before a judge?  
To be sure, sovereigns bear unique responsibility for the welfare
of society as a whole and must therefore retain a freedom of action
greater than that of ordinary economic actors.214  There is little
reason to think, however, that the blunderbuss of sovereign
immunity is necessary to ensure that the government does not
overcommit itself.  As discussed above, it is already well established
that any surrender of sovereign power must occur in unmistakable
terms215 and, indeed, that a sovereign’s police powers cannot be
surrendered at all.216  Courts have in the past applied these
doctrines to relieve sovereign overcommitment and will no doubt
continue to do so in the future.  Nor is there anything to prevent
judges from adding to this corpus of sovereign contracts law, if
needed.  As the unmistakability and reserved powers doctrines
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illustrate, courts are perfectly capable of fashioning common law
principles that are more responsive to the sovereign’s unique
circumstances than the rules of ordinary private law.  It remains
open, for example, for courts to narrow the range of remedies
available against the sovereign for breach of contract by excluding
recovery of expectation damages, as Gillian Hadfield has urged.217
From a plaintiff’s perspective, the existence of a body of public
contracts law that restricts governmental liability is surely
preferable to a constitutional rule of sovereign immunity that
enables the government simply to deny any kind of judicial recourse
at all.
Above all, it must be remembered that the impact of sovereign
immunity extends far beyond the cost of government borrowing or
contracting.  The consequences of sovereign commitment and judicial
enforcement cannot be reduced entirely to a matter of dollars and
cents.  Our Constitution is itself a commitment.  At root, it embodies
a sovereign commitment to exercise power only within specified
limits.  As a form of commitment, the Constitution succeeds only if
it is both effective and persuasive: it must be effective, in that it must
actually restrict the sovereign if our liberty is to be secure, but it
must also be persuasive, in that it must win popular acceptance of
the government that it creates.
By deciding suits against the sovereign, courts promote the
success of the Constitution-as-commitment along both dimensions.
First, they may sometimes discourage or restrain the sovereign from
exceeding constitutional bounds, notwithstanding their limited
capacity for coercion.  That is, courts have a role to play in making
the Constitution an effective commitment.  Second, and no less
importantly, the mere availability of a credible judicial forum for
complaints against the government confers legitimacy upon the
entire constitutional order.  Even if courts cannot actually enforce
the law against the sovereign, they can still provide valuable
information about the extent of sovereign compliance with the law.
Assuming that the sovereign does in fact honor the Constitution and
the rule of law, this information will serve only to reinforce the
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legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people.  A faithful
sovereign thus has much to gain from judicial monitoring of its
actions.  A tyrannical government, by contrast, has much to hide,
and an expansive doctrine of sovereign immunity may indeed bolster
the legitimacy of such a regime by shielding its behavior from
unwelcome judicial scrutiny.  Yet this is all the more reason for
courts to set aside the notion of sovereign immunity, and to exercise
jurisdiction over suits against the government.  For what greater
service can the courts perform than to warn the people when
tyranny is upon them?
